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The topic of this thesis is the project of hosting the 2034 Winter Olympic and Paralympic
Games in Norway, studying its potential profitability. Subsequent to a recent project by
the International Olympic Committee, known as the New Norm, the requirements for
hosting the Olympics and Paralympics have undergone a revision. As a result, the many
conditions faced by the Oslo 2022 Committee are not the same today.
Our study consists of an analysis of the direct cash flow effects of the Olympic project,
resulting in a static net present value as a measure of its profitability, as well as a
discussion of real options and external effects, and their potential impact on the expanded
net present value. The result of our analysis is a negative static net present value
of NOK 2 930 123 000, leaving the project unprofitable. Our discussion regarding the
expanded net present value suggests there is a potential for the project having indirect
effects on the Norwegian economy which could justify undertaking it despite our main
findings. This decision would depend on the magnitude of such effects, and requires a
further economic analysis building on our results.
In addition to the main findings, our study also suggests there is a potential for cutting
certain costs due to the revisions made by the New Norm. Our analysis is based on
estimates from previous Olympic budgets, and as a result their processes and strategies.
Due to the lack of information and resources available to us, our study is unable to
capture the full potential of the New Norm revisions for optimising processes such as the
transportation and technology concepts, venue plan, etc. With access to this information, a
planning committee would be better suited for conducting these optimisations, potentially
increasing the value of the project to some extent.
In summary, our results provide insight to and establishes a baseline for a further
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1 Introduction
1.1 Topic and research question
In 2017, the Voss sports council started to explore the idea of hosting the Winter Olympics
in Norway again, and formed Idrettens Olympiade. Idrettens Olympiade has initiated
a process for deciding if Norway should launch a bid to host the Winter Olympic and
Paralympic Games in 2034, requesting a thesis on this topic to aid them in their work.
Responding to their request, this thesis is an ex ante project analysis of a potential Winter
Olympic and Paralympic Games in Norway 2034.
The background for this thesis is the IOC’s implementation of their new Olympic Standard,
namely the New Norm. The New Norm is a set of 118 reforms aiming to improve the
Olympic’s economic, social and environmental footprint in the host region. The cost
of hosting the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games has been the major setback for
all Norwegian initiatives after 1994. This has led to a large debate regarding Olympic
costs and the IOC’s standing in Norway. Idrettens Olympiade’s initiative is the first
attempt to applying for the Games subsequent to the launching of the New Norm, and the
examination of its effect on the costs and benefits of a Winter Olympic and Paralympic
games in Norway seems an intriguing one.
The research question for this thesis is whether or not hosting a post New Norm Winter
Olympic and Paralympic Games in Norway is profitable, and how its profitability might
influence the decision of launching the project.
1.2 Scope and limitations
The main subject of this project analysis is the study of the direct revenues and costs
related to the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. We analyse the project from
the standpoint of the Norwegian authorities as a project owner, examining the project’s
cash flow. Furthermore, we will look at the Winter Olympic and Paralympic games’
repercussions. Our study does not have the ambition of providing a full scale economic
analysis of all effects on the Norwegian economy, but touches on the subject through a
discussion of what indirect effects might supplement our findings.
2 1.3 Structure
We will evaluate the project as external analysts and the analysis is based solely on
publicly available information and data.
1.3 Structure
Before embarking on our study, we will give a brief explanation of the project’s background.
Further on, we will establish the theoretical framework to be used for evaluating the
profitability of the potential Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.
In our main analysis, we will give a detailed description of our findings, including an
evaluation of our premises, assumptions and the uncertainty of our estimates.
Before concluding, we will discuss any additional values which may arise from the project.
3
2 Background
2.1 Olympics in Norway
The matter of hosting the Olympic Winter Games has sparked controversy in Norway
numerous times in recent years. Although Norway’s most recent Olympic Games,
Lillehammer 1994, are still regarded as a great success and a fond national memory,
today’s attitude towards repeating the endeavour is split at best1.
On the one hand, Norway is the most successful of the contending nations2. Additionally,
the public interest in winter sports and the lasting traditions for them have quite a unique
standing in Norway compared to most other countries. On the other hand, hosting the
Olympics has proven costly. The cost has also been the main subject of discussion in
relation to the previous attempts at filing a Norwegian application, namely for Tromsø
2018 and Oslo 20223. An important part of this has of course been the many conditions
set by the IOC, for which they have been heavily criticised, adding to the costs without
any apparent benefit for the host nation4.
The high cost was, along with the IOC’s flailing reputation, a main factor leading to the
vote against filing the application for hosting the Winter Olympics in Oslo in 20225.
2.2 The New Norm
The IOC has responded to the criticism by revising their conditions through their project
the New Norm6, aiming to cut unnecessarily costly conditions and facilitating more
sustainable Games. A main theme of the revision is the emphasis on utilising existing
venues and infrastructure.
Former Olympic Games have often seen a display of brand new and extravagant stadiums
and venues, showcasing architectural splendour, before falling into disuse or use well below
1See Strøm (2019), Bernhus (2019)
2Statista (2020)
3E.g. Fossen et al. (2014), Sivertsen (2018)
4Fossen et al. (2014)
5See NRK (2014), Bugge (2014)
6IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018)
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their capacities7, although this is not a general rule8. After the New Norm, potential
hosts are encouraged to reuse their existing venues as much as possible9. If there are
no appropriate venues, they are encouraged to construct new ones with legacy in mind,
ensuring they serve their purpose long after the Games are finished, or alternatively use
temporary venues. The conditions have also become more flexible with regards to moving
events away from the main city, even out of the host country10.
No Olympic Games have been held subsequent to the New Norm, but a few have
been granted. Among them is the 2026 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games in
Milano/Cortina Italy11. They were elected over Stockholm/Åre Sweden in the final vote.
The two candidates’ applications give some insight as to how the implications of the New
Norm may play out in practice12. It is, however, important to bear in mind that their
candidature processes were not entirely within the New Norm regulations, which will not
be the case until the 2030s13.
2.3 Future possibilities
The steps taken by the IOC have not gone unnoticed14. With the prospects of more
affordable Olympics, plans are being developed for a new Norwegian application. New
possibilities for a larger geographic spread of the Games have sparked plans for a different
layout than has been the case for the previous attempts15.
The most recent initiative has been taken by Idrettens Olympiade, suggesting to host
Olympic and Paralympic Games across most regions of the country, minimising the
construction of new facilities and avoiding any Games specific permanent works16.This is
the project for which this thesis has been requested, and is the baseline for our analysis.
7Kasimati (2015), Flygind (2014), Grebey and Shaw (2018), Ponic (2020)
8Barber (2018)
9IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018) p. 25
10Ibid.
11IOC Media Relations Team (2019)
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5
3 Approach
3.1 Idrettens Olympiade’s requests
We were presented with Idrettens Olympiade’s ambitions during the planning phase of this
thesis. They have discussed where in Norway it could be reasonable to host the different
Olympic and Paralympic events, and come up with different alternatives throughout the
country17. It was also clear they regarded the utilisation of several regions as an objective
in its own right, with a special emphasis on using the western part of the country.
Their request from us was an academic analysis of the costs and benefits of their plans for
Olympic and Paralympic Games in Norway in 2030 or 2034. Apart from this baseline,
the rest has been up to us, and we are not bound by their premises in any way.
3.2 Baseline for our analysis
Starting with the possibilities presented to us by Idrettens Olympiade, and through
conversations with them, we have designed an illustrative Olympic concept as the subject
of our analysis. This involves using the most appropriate and up-to-date existing venues
available, see table 5.12 for details. In order to examine the possibility of using several
regions, we have used this as a criterion where several venues are available, moving freestyle
skiing and snowboarding to Voss, biathlon to Trondheim and so on.
We have also had conversation with Tom Tvedt, former President of the Norwegian Sports
Association, and Magnus Sverdrup, Special Advisor and leader of International Sports
Politics in the Norwegian Sports Association, aiding us in gathering information about
the IOC, the New Norm and hosting Olympic and Paralympic events.
For the purpose of how this thesis can be applied to further work on the subject, it is
important to note the concept which is analysed is simply an illustration of one possible
plan for hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Norway in 2034. We do not have
the information nor the resources for conducting an in depth evaluation of what would be
the optimal plan, but are quite certain our illustration is a viable option.
17Idrettens Olympiade, presentasjon (2020)
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3.3 Hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games
The costs and revenues of hosting the Olympics/Paralympics, are defined by what measures
they require and what possibilities they generate. The obvious examples are the need for
sporting and other venues, and the possibility for selling tickets to the events, but there
are numerous other sources of expense and of income. A detailed description of these is




The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the profitability of hosting the Winter Olympics
in Norway. For this purpose, we need a theoretical framework for determining what
constitutes a profitable project, and how this project performs based on those criteria.
In the case of the Winter Olympics, the ”investor” or ”project owner” is the Norwegian
authorities on behalf of the Norwegian people. In order to determine the correct framework
for the profitability analysis, we will, in addition to looking at the standards for public
investments in Norway, examine existing studies from similar events.
4.2 Standards for public investments
For all projects and for all investors, there is a desire to use the resources available to
them in an efficient way. Naturally, this assumption also applies to investments in which
a nation owns the project. For this purpose, the Norwegian Government Agency for
Administration and Financial Management has created guidelines on how to conduct
economic analyses and states that there are three methods applicable to the evaluation of
the surplus from public investments18:
1. Cost/benefit analyses19, which aim to highlight all effects of an action. All
consequences should be quantified to the extent possible. If the benefits sum up to
be larger than the costs, the investment is considered profitable.
2. A cost effectiveness analysis20 should be used when the benefits are assumed to
remain unchanged. It is an analysis focusing solely on the cost, and the cheapest
option is therefore considered the most profitable.
3. Cost impact analyses21 are used for cases where the benefits are difficult to
quantify. They are based on qualitative measures of the benefits, while the costs are
18Direktoratet for økonomistyring (2018)
19NOU 2012: 16. (2012)
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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quantified.
4.3 Existing literature
Proponents of Olympic bids often justify the games by claiming that the Olympics will
provide major economic benefits to the host region. The size of these economic benefits
is however rather uncertain, and many studies have been conducted with an aim to
measuring the benefits of hosting the Olympics (or similar mega-events). Roughly, there
are two different methods that have been used in these studies; cost/benefit analysis
(CBA)22 and economic impact analysis23.
4.3.1 Economic impact analysis
The goal of an economic impact analysis is to measure the total economic impact, including
that of the non-quantifiable effects of a cost/benefit analysis. It uses input-output tables
to estimate multiplier effect from the realisation of new products, for example an increased
demand for goods, services and labour, arising from the project (Pilipenko (2013)). The
impacts are normally measured by their effects on Gross Domestic Product, job creation,
increased tourism, etc. The method has, however, been criticised for over-estimating the
economic impact of mega events24.
The main basis for this criticism is the assumption that all expenditures and capital costs
have a positive impact on the studied economy. An economic impact analysis assumes
no money is wasted. As a result, almost all projects assessed by an economic impact
analysis turn out to be attractive for public spending because the analysis assumes that
all public spending stimulates further economic activity, although there is no guarantee
that the employees and capital owners will spend their income in the home economy25.
Furthermore, and specifically relevant for an analysis of the Olympic project, all jobs
that are created from an investment are assumed to be permanent26. For a one-time
sports event, it is likely that many of the new jobs will be temporary, thus failing to serve
as a permanent benefit for the economy. Finally, in an economic impact analysis, the
22See for instance Pilipenko (2013) or Shaffer et al. (2003)
23See for instance Blake (2005) or Preuss (2004)
24See for instance Crompton (1995) or Hudson (2001)
25E.g. Taks et al. (2011)
26Pilipenko (2013)
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opportunity costs are essentially ignored, due to the assumption that the input factors
of the studied economy are underutilised, and that any project can be realised without
affecting other projects. Several studies have shown that this assumption rarely holds in
reality27.
Although an economic impact analysis is intended to measure the total economic impact
of a project, it is based on many assumptions which, in most cases, are violated. The
result is that it often fails in measuring the true impact28. Since it is likely that most of
the economic impact of the Olympic project is quantifiable and because it aligns with the
Norwegian standards for public investments, we will conduct a cost/benefit analysis. We
will, however, delimit the analysis somewhat, as explained below.
4.3.2 Cost/benefit analysis
As previously mentioned, the goal of a cost benefit analysis is to compute the total net
benefit (cost) related to a project. Benefit in traditional cost-benefit studies is measured
by the consumers’ willingness to pay, or in other words: what the consumers are willing
to give up of other goods for what the project provides. The costs are measured by the
opportunity cost: what people or a society give up by investing capital and employing
workers in one project as opposed to any other. More specifically, a cost benefit analysis
measure if the people are willing to pay for the resources required to host to Olympics,
instead of using the resources on something else. A typical cost-benefit analysis includes
the following steps29:
1. Explaining the purpose of the CBA
2. Specifying the set of alternative projects
3. Deciding whose benefits and costs count
4. Predicting impacts quantitatively over time
5. Monetising all impacts
6. Discounting costs and benefits to present values
27See for instance Crompton (1995) or Taks et al. (2011)
28Hudson (2001)
29Boardman et al. (2018)
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7. Computing NPVs for each alternative
8. Performing sensitivity analyses
9. Making a recommendation
In addition to the pure economic impacts (i.e payable costs and tax income), a cost-benefit
analysis also takes into account social, environmental and other impacts that affect the
utility of consumers. However, many of these impacts are difficult to quantify (e.g. the
total economic benefit of lower CO2 emissions). In most cases, in a cost benefit analysis,
the potential costs or benefits of such hard-to-quantify effects are left to a qualitative
discussion. This ensures all effects are taken into account, although a quantification is
always preferable over a mere discussion.
4.4 Discounted cash flow
4.4.1 Net present value
The main criterion for determining the profitability of a project, is its ability to generate
returns exceeding the investor’s required return on his capital. In other words: the
economic value added (EVA)30 for the project.
This is normally measured by the project’s net present value. The net present value is
the difference between the present value of the future cash inflows and outflows, where
the present value31 is the future cash flow discounted at a discount rate. The purpose of
discounting is to acknowledge the fact that there are alternative usages for the invested
capital. As seen from (4.1): the higher the discount rate, the lower the present value of
future cash flows. Determining the appropriate discount rate is therefore key to properly
evaluating future cash flows. The appropriate discount rate for this project will be
discussed in the following, under section 5.1.4.
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T = set of time periods in question
I0 = Invested capital in period 0 (today)
CFt = Cash flow in period t
r = discount rate
The rule of thumb is that a project with a positive NPV is accepted, and a project with a
negative NPV is rejected32. Thus, the Olympics should be accepted if the NPV for the
project as a whole is greater than or equal to 0.
4.4.2 Flexibility
A traditional assumption in a present value analysis is that a project is held passively
through it’s economic lifetime and that the management is unable to influence the
profitability of an ongoing project. In the real world, however, the management is often
able to evaluate ongoing projects and make adjustments as they see how things unfold.
This flexibility is referred to as real options33. A real option is defined as a right, but not
an obligation, to undertake certain business opportunities. As a matter of consequence,
the value of a real option cannot be negative. The alternative to making use of it is simply
not to do so. For example, if the curling interest in Norway increases significantly in
the years prior to the Olympics, the host organisation could increase the capacity of the
curling arena, enabling the sale of more tickets.
4.4.3 External effects
The goal of a net present value analysis is to quantify all the economic consequences
of a project and then calculate the overall profitability of the project. Some of these
consequences could be difficult to quantify, but they could still have a significant impact,
either positively or negatively, on the overall profitability. Hiller and Wanner (2015)
documented that Olympic hosting produces psycho-social benefits and that the festival
atmosphere positively affects the public mood. Similarly, Pawlowski et al. (2014) concluded
that hosting events raises subjective well-being even more than the pride from sporting
success. A happy public could have a positive impact on people’s productivity34 and
32Bøhren and Gjærum (2009)
33Hayes (2020)
34Zelenski et al. (2008)
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absenteeism35. Although the economic effect of a happy population is difficult to quantify,
it is still, among many others, an effect which could be crucial to the decision of whether
or not to host the Olympics. A basic net present value analysis neglects effects such as
these, which could lead to a decision based on too little information.
4.4.4 Expanded net present value
Our profitability analysis is intended to illustrate the costs and benefits directly related to
the Winter Olympics project, serving as a baseline for a broader analysis investigating the
full impact of hosting the Winter Olympic Games. In order to facilitate this application, we
will expand the traditional net present value analysis by discussing the value of flexibility
and external effects that might arise from the event. By doing so, we will get a more
nuanced picture of the overall profitability, serving as a better basis for making decisions
than the static net present value alone. This approach aligns with Norwegian Authorities’
standard for economic analysis36. Mathematically, the expanded net present value is
presented as follows:
Expanded NPV = Static NPV + Value of flexibility ± External effects
4.5 Limitations and our approach
Winter Olympics is a large and complicated project. Due to the time and resources
available, we have to make some necessary limitations to this thesis. As mentioned above,
the benefit side of a cost/benefit analysis is people’s willingness to pay. We will not try
estimate the Norwegian population’s utility from the Olympics, but instead focus on the
direct income and costs related to the project. One could argue that this limitation causes
our analysis not to give a clear picture of the project’s total net benefit (cost), which, to a
certain extent is true. It is, however, less problematic considering the fact that people’s
utility from the Olympics is very unlikely to be negative. This implies that if we find the
Olympic project to be profitable, from a financial point of view, it is very likely that it is
profitable for the economy as a whole. In any case, the result will serve as a necessary
35George (1989)
36Direktoratet for økonomistyring (2018)
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starting point for a further investigation of the less direct impacts of the project.






5.1.1.1.1 Timeline The base year of our calculation is 2021 and the net present value
is based on the nominal cash flow impact on the total capital before tax. The final year of
the planning horizon is 2036, as we expect some Games related cash flows to occur in the
years following the events, giving the project a lifetime of 15 years. We have assumed an
annual inflation rate of 2 %37.
5.1.1.1.2 VAT For simplicity, we have included VAT in all our calculations, as opinions
differ regarding the IOC’s and Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG)
tax status in Norway38.
5.1.1.1.3 Capital structure Our cash flow is that of the total capital, disregarding
how it is financed. Miller and Modigliani state that as long as we do not have access to
subsidised loans and the tax system is neutral, a project’s value will not be influenced
by the capital structure39. Building on this, we have disregarded the financing, assuming
that the OCOG can borrow money at market price and that the tax system does not
favour equity over debt or vice versa.
5.1.1.1.4 Currency Seeing as most revenue and costs are in Norwegian Kroner
(NOK), so are our cash flow calculations. Where necessary, we have assumed an exchange
rate (USD/NOK) of 9.0040 for the entire economic lifetime of the project. The exchange
rate is naturally a key uncertainty factor, and changes in the exchange rate would largely
influence our calculations, potentially causing an estimation error.
37Norges Bank (2020)
38Deloitte Advokatfirma AS (2013)
39Brealey et al. (2008)
40The exchange rate estimation with the longest horizon on https://tradingeconomics.com/forecast/
currency
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5.1.1.2 Sources
In order to estimate the different cash flow variables, we have largely relied on six different
sources of information:
1. The Oslo 2022 budget, presented in the quality control of the Oslo 2022 application
for state guarantee (DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia
AS (2013)).
2. The Oslo 2022 Olympic Office’s own work regarding the consequences of the 2022
games in Oslo (Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013a)).
3. The Milano/Cortina 2026 budget included in their Olympic bid (International
Olympic Committee (2019)).
4. The Stockholm/Åre 2026 budget included in their Olympic bid (International
Olympic Committee (2019)).
5. The operational requirements from the host city contract between IOC and
Milano/Cortina 2026 (IOC, Host City Contract (2018a)).
6. The New Norm, as described by IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018).
5.1.1.3 Scaling
Another key prerequisite for conducting our analyses is an overview of all dimensioning
factors41. We have the following key assumtpions:
• We expect approx. the same number of athletes in 2034 as in PyeonChang 2018.
• There is a 1:1 relationship between athletes and team officials, i.e. 1 athlete requires
an average of 1 team official.
• The media and volunteer requirements will be the same as for Oslo 2022.
• The number of Paralympic athletes and team officials is the same as for Oslo 2022.
Furthermore, we have assumed the winter sports which traditionally have the greatest
popularity in Norway to sell out completely. Less popular sports are assumed to generate
an average ticket sale of 60 % of their venue capacities.
41See appendix A1 for details
16 5.1 Cash flow
5.1.2 Budget
The first step of our analysis is the calculation of all revenues and costs, presented in table
5.1. We found a surplus of 2034 NOK - 3 976 500 000 before discounting the cash flows.
A detailed description of the methodology, assumptions, findings and uncertainty for each
item is presented in the following.
Table 5.1: Budget
Revenue NOK (000) %
IOC Contribution 4 672 900 43%
TOP Programme 2 067 600 19%
Domestic sponsorship 1 477 900 14%
Ticket sales 1 681 300 15%
Licensing and merchandising 397 900 4%
Other revenue 586 400 5%
Total revenue 10 884 000 100%
Expenditure
Venue infrastructure 300 900 2%
Venue rent and provisionals 1 713 500 12%
Transport 268 500 2%
Accommadation 245 500 2%
Medical services 134 200 1%
Security 3 026 400 20%
Technology 2 747 400 18%
People management 3 799 000 26%
Ceremonies and culture 621 800 4%
Communication, marketing and look 620 000 4%
Corporate admin. and legacy 527 100 4%
Other expenses 856 200 6%
Total expenditure 14 860 500 100%
Surplus -3 976 500
5.1.3 Timing
As previously mentioned, a key to a net present value analysis is taking the monetary time
value into account. Because the information about when different revenues and costs arise
is not specified in any of the available sources, we have had to make several assumptions.
Although these assumptions are unlikely to be 100% accurate, our aim is to acknowledge
which items are first to arise and when the largest proportion of each item occurs. All our
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assumptions are found in appendix A9.
Seeing as we have not been able to verify our assumptions regarding timing, it is a major
uncertainty factor.
5.1.4 Discount rate
The discount rate, or the required rate of return, is intended to reflect the return achievable
from an available and equally risky alternative investment. In other words: the discount
rate shows an investor’s cost of capital42.
One common way to calculate the discount rate is to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). This single-factor model calculates the required rate of return based on how the
project varies in relation to a market portfolio, see (5.1) below.
Ke = rf +  i(E(rm) + rf ) (5.1)
Ke = Return on equity
rf = Risk free rate
 i = beta of asset i
E(rm) = Expected market return
This model assumes the investor to be well diversified, which implies that only the
systematic (market) risk is relevant. It is reasonable to assume the Norwegian authorities
to be a well diversified investor.
As mentioned under section 5.1.1.1.2, we do not take into account the effects of capital
structure. The return on equity will thus be equal to the total return:
ke = kr
Finding the correct risk free rate requires taking the economic lifetime of the project
and the currency being used in the cash flow estimate43 into account. Because we use
Norwegian Kroner in our estimates, we need a Norwegian risk free rate. Furthermore,
42Bøhren and Gjærum (2009)
43Brealey et al. (2008)
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our required rate of return requires a risk free rate with approximately 15 years maturity.
NOU 2012: 16. (2012) has calculated the the risk free rate for projects with an economic
lifetime of less than 40 years to 2.5 %.
An asset’s beta (5.2) is a measurement of the extent to which an asset’s return is influenced





For the Olympic project, both the project’s variance and its covariance with the market
are unknown. In such cases, it is regarded reasonable to use peer projects as a proxy
for estimating a benchmark beta. Peer projects would in this case naturally be previous
Olympic Games, but their beta and source of funding are not publicly available data.
Furthermore, no suitable market of reference exists. Due to this lack of information, an
attempt to estimate the Olympics’ beta based on e.g. the Oslo Stock Exchange would be
unreliable44.
However, since the project owner of the winter Olympics 2034 is the Norwegian people, it
categorises as a public investment. The discount rate for Norwegian public investments
with an economic lifetime of less than 40 years is set to 4 %45 (risk free rate of 2.5 % + risk
premium of 1.5 %). The standard holds an ambition of, to the extent possible, evaluating
systematic risk, and thus discount rate, independently for each individual project46. As
described above, an individual evaluation of the systematic risk is not possible for the
Olympic project, due to the lack of a reference market and data from similar projects.
5.1.5 Static Net Present Value
5.1.5.1 Findings
Based on our premises and all assumptions and calculations, described in detail in section
5.2 below, we have calculated a net present value of NOK -2 930 123 000. According to
the profitability criterion presented in section 4.4.1, the Winter Olympics in Norway 2034
44A similar problem is faced by emerging economies’ analysts, where the lack of historical data on
stock prices complicates the computation of the beta. See Akdeniz et al. (2003)
45NOU 2012: 16. (2012)
46Ibid.
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is not profitable. The entire cash flow can be found in appendix A10.
This is, however, before taking the value of flexibility and external effects into account,
which will be discussed in section 6.
5.1.5.2 Uncertainty
Our profitability analysis of winter Olympics 2034 is an ex ante evaluation based on our
best estimates of costs and revenue between 2021 and 2036. As all these items have
yet to occur, our estimates are indeed uncertain. Furthermore, the quantity and quality
of publicly available data regarding each item varies, forcing us to making necessary
assumptions in many of our estimates, each of which is thoroughly described in section
5.2.
Nevertheless, some interesting questions might be addressed through an examination of
the uncertainty at a more general level:
1. What would it take for the static NPV to be positive?
2. How sensitive is the total net present value to changes in total revenue and expense?
3. Which items (revenues or expenses) have the greatest impact on the static net
present value?
Table 5.2 shows how sensitive the static net present value is to changes in the total
revenues and total cost (and any combination of changes).
Table 5.2: NPV sensitivity by total revenue and total cost
Cost
Revenue -30 % -20 % -10 % 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 %
-30 % -2 051 086 -1 387 986 -724 887 -61 787 601 313 1 264 413 1 927 512
-24 % -2 624 753 -1 961 653 -1 298 554 -635 454 27 646 690 745 1 353 845
-18 % -3 198 420 -2 535 321 -1 872 221 -1 209 121 -546 021 117 078 780 178
-12 % -3 772 087 -3 108 988 -2 445 888 -1 782 788 -1 119 689 -456 589 206 511
-6 % -4 345 755 -3 682 655 -3 019 555 -2 356 456 -1 693 356 -1 030 256 -367 156
0 % -4 919 422 -4 256 322 -3 593 222 -2 930 123 -2 267 023 -1 603 923 -940 824
6 % -5 493 089 -4 829 989 -4 166 890 -3 503 790 -2 840 690 -2 177 590 -1 514 491
12 % -6 066 756 -5 403 656 -4 740 557 -4 077 457 -3 414 357 -2 751 258 -2 088 158
18 % -6 640 423 -5 977 324 -5 314 224 -4 651 124 -3 988 025 -3 324 925 -2 661 825
24 % -7 214 090 -6 550 991 -5 887 891 -5 224 791 -4 561 692 -3 898 592 -3 235 492
30 % -7 787 758 -7 124 658 -6 461 558 -5 798 459 -5 135 359 -4 472 259 -3 809 159
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At our estimated total cost, the revenue would have to increase by more than 40 % for
the static NPV to be positive. Alternatively, the cost would have to be reduced by a little
more than 30 % at our estimated revenue. In the upper right of the table, we see how a
combination of reduced costs and increased revenue might result in a positive static NPV.
These figures give some indication of the required value of the external effects relative to
the invested amounts, in order for the project of hosting the 2034 Winter Olympic and
Paralympic Games in Norway to be worthwhile.
We also note that the static net present value is more sensitive to changes in total cost
than to total revenue. This is natural when taking their relative sizes and timing into
account, as the costs are larger than the revenue and occur earlier in the planning horizon
(e.g. costs related to the application process)47.
Figure (5.1) below shows how much each item impacts the total NPV.
Figure 5.1: NPV sensitivity by items
Naturally, the largest items (e.g. IOC contribution and people management) have the
largest impact on the static net present value. Equally natural, the items occurring early
in the planning horizon have a greater impact than those which occur closer to the games.
If the OCOG aims to increase the static net present value, they should follow the Willie
Sutton Rule48 and focus on the items which impact is greatest on the static NPV.
47See appendix A10 and A9 for details
48Bjørnenak (2019)
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5.1.5.3 NPV profile
Although we are not able to evaluate the Olympic project’s exposure to systematic risk49,
an examination of the project’s sensitivity to changes in the discount rate serves as a
reasonable illustration of the effect. Figure 5.2 shows the project’s net present value at
different discount rates. Please note that the vertical axis ranges from 0 to -4 million,
illustrating an increase in NPV as the discount rate increases.
Figure 5.2: NPV profile
The figure shows that the project has a negative net present value for the entire range
of discount rates. Because the project has a net cash outflow in its early years, which is
never compensated by large net inflows, no discount rate will cause NPV to be positive.
5.1.5.4 VAT
As mentioned under 5.1.1.1.2, the IOC and host OCOG VAT status is unclear, and we
have therefore included VAT in our calculations. VAT is revenue to a country’s economy,
used for funding schools, hospitals etc. A large proportion of the negative NPV we have
calculated originates from VAT. A large proportion of the costs will thus be paid to the
Norwegian economy and should not be considered a cost for the Norwegian economy as a
whole.
49As mentioned under 5.1.4 above
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However, it is reasonable to assume that many of the resources allocated to the Olympic
and Paralympic Games have alternative uses and would have generated an equal amount
of VAT regardless of the Olympic and Paralympic games. This implies that the VAT
generated from resources that would have been used alternatively without the Olympics
should not be considered revenue for the Norwegian economy. Only the VAT from excess
activities generated directly from the Olympics should be considered as revenue for the
Norwegian economy.
Valuating the excess VAT is naturally a complicated task and outside the scope of this
paper. However, by including VAT in our calculations, we have indirectly assumed that
the Olympics do not generate any excess activities. This assumption is unlikely to hold,
leaving our calculated cost for the Norwegian economy likely to be overestimated. Decision
makers should evaluate the consequences of VAT before deciding on whether or not to
apply for the Olympics 2034.
5.2 Details
5.2.1 Introduction
Under this section, we aim to give some insight to the details of the cash flow, item by
item, from which our static net present value is calculated. It will give a detailed overview
of the assumptions we have made, how we have estimated the cost or revenue of each
item, which items have the largest impact on the total profitability and which are the
most important to consider more closely before making a decision.
5.2.2 Revenue
5.2.2.1 IOC Contribution
In our conversations with Tom Tvedt and Magnus Sverdrup, we were informed that the
IOC provides the OCOG with a substantial financial contribution. The total amount is a
bit unclear, as some of the contribution is based on the OCOG’s specific needs. These
types of contribution are accounted for elsewhere in our analysis, for instance under
5.2.3.10 Corporate Administration and Legacy.
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-10 % -3 213 516
-9 % -3 185 177
-8 % -3 156 838
-7 % -3 128 498
-6 % -3 100 159
-5 % -3 071 820
-4 % -3 043 480
-3 % -3 015 141
-2 % -2 986 801
-1 % -2 958 462
0 % -2 930 123
1 % -2 901 783
2 % -2 873 444
3 % -2 845 105
4 % -2 816 765
5 % -2 788 426
6 % -2 760 086
7 % -2 731 747
8 % -2 703 408
9 % -2 675 068
10 % -2 646 729
A good portion of the contribution is, however, a direct payment of USD 452 000 000,
related to revenues generated from Broadcast Agreements50. In 2034 NOK the amount is
4 672 900 000.
It is important to note this number is specific for the Milano/Cortina 2026 Games. There
is no guarantee it will be exactly the same for other editions. This uncertainty is illustrated
by its effect on the total NPV in table 5.3 below.
5.2.2.2 TOP Sponsors
A good portion of the sponsors for the Olympics and Paralympics are from TOP51,
including both cash and value-in-kind. The value of this contribution was estimated at
USD 200 million for the 2026 Olympics52. In 2034, it is NOK 2 067 600 000.
50IOC, XXV Olympic Winter Games 2026 (2018) art. 9
51The Olympic Programme, also known as the International Programme, see IOC, Olympic Agenda
2020 (2018) page 3 and IOC, XXV Olympic Winter Games 2026 (2018) page 25.
52Ibid. §8.2(b)
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This is exactly what Milano/Cortina expected53 Stockholm/Åre expected USD 300
million54, which we cannot know if they would be granted.
For the purpose of considering the possibility of a greater contribution, our sensitivity
analysis spans upwards to a 50 % increase. We do not consider a lower future contribution
a possibility.





0 % -2 930 123
2 % -2 898 320
5 % -2 866 518
8 % -2 834 716
10 % -2 802 914
13 % -2 771 111
15 % -2 739 309
18 % -2 707 507
20 % -2 675 705
23 % -2 643 902
25 % -2 612 100
28 % -2 580 298
30 % -2 548 496
33 % -2 516 693
35 % -2 484 891
38 % -2 453 089
40 % -2 421 286
43 % -2 389 484
45 % -2 357 682
48 % -2 325 880
50 % -2 294 077
5.2.2.3 Domestic sponsors
The expected contribution from domestic sponsors for Oslo 2022 was NOK 960 000 00055.
Accounting for the growth in the sponsor market, about 4 %56, our estimate for 2034 is
NOK 1 477 900 000.
We note that the Swedish and Italian expectations are far greater57, but as they are largely
53International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 74. (The budgeted number is their 2018 NPV).
54International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37
55DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 66
56NTB (2017)
57International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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separate markets, we use the numbers from Oslo 2022. This is still an implication that
our number could very well be underestimated, illustrated by the span of our sensitivity
analysis.





-25 % -3 157 442
-20 % -3 111 978
-15 % -3 066 514
-10 % -3 021 050
-5 % -2 975 586
0 % -2 930 123
5 % -2 884 658
10 % -2 839 194
15 % -2 793 731
20 % -2 748 267
25 % -2 702 803
30 % -2 657 339
35 % -2 611 875
40 % -2 566 411
45 % -2 520 947
50 % -2 475 483
55 % -2 430 019
60 % -2 384 556
65 % -2 339 092
70 % -2 293 628
75 % -2 248 164
5.2.2.4 Ticket Sales
5.2.2.4.1 Description Ticketing and Hospitality represent the most prominent, and
often first and last, contact that spectators have with the Games. Spectator experience is
one of the key criteria for a positive public opinion and thus the success of the games. The
host OCOG is entitled to retain the gross revenues generated from ticket sales, including
hospitality58.
The IOC makes requirements and provides guidelines to the host OCOG on how to handle
ticket sales. The main target is full stadiums, prioritising fans’ access to events59. The
58IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) §8.1(b)
59IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 37
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ticketing strategy must be approved by the IOC and must contain a detailed plan which,
among other things, includes:
• A ticketing and hospitality plan which includes all Olympic ticket prices and
pricing zones and all ticket allocation plans for different stackeholders (e.g. fans,
athletes’ families, etc.).
• A full stadium strategy, which is a detailed plan to optimise sales and attendance
for all events.
• A plan to minimise unauthorised ticket resale.
5.2.2.4.2 Assumptions/Our Approach Naturally, the ticket revenue is a function
of price and sales volume. The optimal ticket price is one which maximises ticket
revenue while still filling the stadiums as much as possible, criteria we expect Oslo 2022
Stockholm/Åre 2026 and Milano/Cortina 2026 to have worked by. We have assumed,
according to standard economic theory, that the audience is sensitive to changes in ticket
prices and that a higher price would lead to lower volume (and vice versa).
Finding the correct price and volume for each different ticket zone for every single Olympic
and Paralympic event would involve planning to a level of detail beyond the scope of this
paper60. We have applied (5.3) and calculated an average61 price of approx. 1400 NOK
and 1720 NOK for Stockholm/Åre 2026 and Milano/Cortina 2026 respectively, with 100
% of tickets sold.
60According to IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 37 the ticketing strategy should include this
information





cv · dv · sv
(5.3)
p = Ticket price
V = Set of all venues
R = Ticket revenue
cv = Capacity in venue v
dv = Event days in venue v
sv = Presumed coverage in venue v
We do note that the actual number of tickets sold might include tickets to non-competitive
events, making it higher than the total venue capacities, meaning the actual average price
is consequently somewhat lower. We do find these prices to be higher than expected,
especially considering the significantly lower estimate of Oslo 2022 at NOK 55062. In
order to avoid an overestimation, we place the average ticket price (per person/day) in the
lower part of the interval between the three at NOK 1080, or arbitrarily split for Olympics
and Paralympics at 1200 and 700 respectively.
Secondly, we had to calculate the correct sales volume. Naturally, we cannot sell more
tickets than the sum of the venue capacities. Our sales volume is based on a qualitative
discussion of the national and international interest in each sport. We have assumed the
following (average) sales coverage for each venue.
62DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 66
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Table 5.6: Capacities and ticket volume
Sport City Event days Presumed avg coverage Capacity Estimated tickets sold
Alpine skiing Narvik 8 1 10 000 80 000
Biathlon Trondheim 9 1 20 000 180 000
Sliding Lillehammer 14 0.6 10 000 84 000
XC Oslo 10 1 28 000 280 000
Nordic combined Oslo 3 1 28 000 84 000
Ski jumping Oslo 4 1 32 000 128 000
Curling Oslo 18 0.6 3 000 32 400
Figure skating Bergen 12 0.6 3 000 21 600
Freestyle skiing/SB Voss 16 1 6 000 96 000
Ice hockey Oslo 16 0.6 7 000 67 200
Short track Bergen 5 0.6 3 000 9 000
Speed skating Bergen 12 1 9 000 108 000
Total 1 170 200
The total average for the Olympics is 83 %, giving a total volume of 1 170 200 tickets, or
one-event ticket equivalents, as the actual Games will have a wider range of types and
classes of tickets available. For the Paralympic Games, we assume that the 2034 games
will sell a total of 340 000 tickets which is close to the sales volume of previous games63.
We assume the sports have the same popularity relative to each other, but less than their
Olympic counter parts, allowing for a reduction of capacities. The Oslo 2022 Committee
calculated an average of 87 % for the Olympics64.
Finally, we have assumed that 25 000 of the 32 000 tickets to the opening and closing
ceremony are available for sale, leaving the same amount of accredited tickets as for Oslo
202265, seeing as this is not mentioned in the New Norm. For the Olympic and Paralympic
ceremonies, this is a total of 100 000 tickets66.
5.2.2.4.3 Findings With an average price of NOK 1080 and a total sale of 1 610 200
tickets, we have calculated a total ticket revenue of NOK 1 681 300 000. This number
seems reasonable and is naturally higher than the Oslo 2022 budget67 p and lower than
both 2026 applicants68.
63International Paralympic Committee (2018)
64DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 66
65Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013b)
664*25 000 = 100 000 tickets
67DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 66
68International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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5.2.2.4.4 Uncertainty Of course, our estimate involves significant uncertainty. As
previously mentioned, ticket revenue is a function of price and volume and both variables
are uncertain. We have therefore conducted a two-way sensitivity analysis of the ticket
revenue showing the impact of changes in price and volume.
The sales volume is dependent on different factors. For instance, the ticket prices will
have a volume impact. Maybe equally important is the domestic interest in a sport and
the possibility for a Norwegian medal. For example, if Norway were to have a dominating
bobsleigh team by 2034, the people of Lillehammer would quite likely buy tickets en
masse and cheer for the Norwegian team. The upper boundary for ticket sales is naturally
given by the capacity in each venue. An average sold out level of 83 % implies that the
maximum growth in sales volume is 20 %69. As Winter sports are very popular in Norway,
we assume it to be highly unlikely for the total ticket sales to stoop below 80 % of the
volume we have assumed.
We have set the price range from approximately NOK 540, lower than the Oslo 2022 ticket
price, to approximately NOK 1850, which is higher than the Milano/Cortina prices. The
total net present value for the games as a whole, for different levels of price and volume is
shown in table 5.7 below.
Table 5.7: Sensitivity by ticket revenue
Volume
Ticket price 652 870 1087 1305 1522 1740
-20 % -3 461 367 -3 297 908 -3 134 448 -2 970 988 -2 807 528 -2 644 068
-16 % -3 436 848 -3 265 216 -3 093 583 -2 921 950 -2 750 317 -2 578 684
-12 % -3 412 329 -3 232 524 -3 052 718 -2 872 912 -2 693 106 -2 513 300
-8 % -3 387 810 -3 199 832 -3 011 853 -2 823 874 -2 635 895 -2 447 916
-4 % -3 363 291 -3 167 140 -2 970 988 -2 774 836 -2 578 684 -2 382 532
0 % -3 338 773 -3 134 448 -2 930 123 -2 725 798 -2 521 473 -2 317 148
4 % -3 314 254 -3 101 756 -2 889 258 -2 676 760 -2 464 262 -2 251 764
8 % -3 289 735 -3 069 064 -2 848 393 -2 627 722 -2 407 051 -2 186 380
12 % -3 265 216 -3 036 372 -2 807 528 -2 578 684 -2 349 840 -2 120 996
16 % -3 240 697 -3 003 680 -2 766 663 -2 529 646 -2 292 629 -2 055 612
20 % -3 216 178 -2 970 988 -2 725 798 -2 480 608 -2 235 418 -1 990 228
Because ticket revenue is a large proportion of the total revenue, changes in ticket revenue
would have a noticeable impact on the overall profitability. Consequently, a good ticketing
690.83*1.2=100 %
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strategy would be important for the OCOG, if Norway were to host the 2034 Winter
Olympics.
5.2.2.5 Licensing and Merchandising
5.2.2.5.1 Description The IOC will implement an International Programme
consisting of, among other things, a worldwide licensing programme related to the
games70. This includes plans for the production and sale of official licensed products and
merchandise, such as the classic Olympic pin. The OCOG has the right to receive a share
of the net revenues from the International Programme, the amount of which is to be
determined by the IOC on its sole discretion71.
5.2.2.5.2 Assumptions/Our Approach Our calculation is based on the Oslo 2022
budget72 and both 2026 applicant budgets73. We assume the Norwegian market for official
Olympic products to be unchanged from the Oslo 2022 application. We have therefore
used the Oslo 2022 number and adjusted it according to inflation.
5.2.2.5.3 Findings and Uncertainty We have calculated the following licensing
and merchandising revenue:
Table 5.8: Licensing and merchandising
2026 applicants74 Oslo 2022 Norway 2034
Licensing and Merchandising 568 305 000 320 000 000 397 900 000
We do note that the 2026 applicants have significantly higher revenue from licensing and
merchandising, which is quite reasonable considering the size of these countries. Because
Sweden and Italy have larger populations than Norway, it is likely that the market for
official products is bigger in these countries. It thus seems reasonable that the 2026
applicants will have higher revenues from licensing and merchandising than Norway 2034.
Nevertheless, the difference also has the possible implication that we (and the Oslo2022
Olympic Office) have underestimated the Norwegian market for official products, reflected
70IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) § 24.7c
71IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) § 8.1e
72DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 67
73International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
74Average: International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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in the range of our sensitivity analysis being -20%/+80% as shown in table 5.9.





-20 % -2 978 152
-15 % -2 966 144
-10 % -2 954 137
-5 % -2 942 130
0 % -2 930 123
5 % -2 918 115
10 % -2 906 108
15 % -2 894 101
20 % -2 882 094
25 % -2 870 087
30 % -2 858 079
35 % -2 846 072
40 % -2 834 065
45 % -2 822 058
50 % -2 810 050
55 % -2 798 043
60 % -2 786 036
65 % -2 774 029
70 % -2 762 022
75 % -2 750 014
80 % -2 738 007
Because licensing and merchandising revenue counts for only 4 % of the total revenue,
and because it mainly occurs during the games, the overall impact of this item on the
total NPV is rather small.
5.2.2.6 Other revenue
5.2.2.6.1 Assumptions/Our Approach We have defined other revenue as revenue
from Paralympics and test events, administration fees for accommodation, revenue from
cultural events, sale of OCOG assets, etc.
Revenue from Paralympics is all other revenue than ticket sales, for example Paralympic
specific sponsors and sale of Paralympics merchandise. Revenue from test events are
all revenues from the mandatory test events75 prior to the games. We do not have the
75All venues should be tested with a sports event. Preferably an event at World Cup scale: IOC, Host
City Contract (2018a) art. 17
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information about revenue from Paralympics and test events from the 2026 applicants,
and have therefore used the Oslo 2022 budget as input.
We assume (real) revenue from Paralympics and test events to be equal to that of Oslo
2022, and have reused the numbers, however adjusted according to inflation.
The administration fee for accommodation is 10 %76 of all accommodation payments for
all accredited personnel, except athletes and team officials. It is calculated as 10 % of
30 days of rent of 20 44877 hotel rooms. Naturally, the administration fee is a direct
consequence of the accommodation prices and rent period and is thus subject to the same
uncertainty as the accommodation costs described in section 5.2.3.4.4.
We assume the remaining items under this umbrella, for example revenue from cultural
events and sale of OCOG assets, to be approximately the same as in the Oslo 2022 budget,
except subjected to inflation.
5.2.2.6.2 Findings and Uncertainty We have calculated the following other
revenue:
Table 5.10: Other Revenue
Revenue NOK 2022 NOK2034
Revenue from Paralympics 128 000 000 159 200 000
Revenue from test events 49 000 000 60 900 000
Administration fees accommodation 136 300 000
Other revenue 185 000 000 230 000 000
Total other revenue 586 400 000
As for all our calculations, this number is subject to uncertainty. Because all numbers
are based on the Oslo 2022 budget, we have selected the same uncertainty interval as the
Oslo 2022 Olympic Office78. As other revenue is a small proportion of the total revenue,
changes within other revenue would have a very marginal impact on the Games’ overall
profitability.
76Consistent with the fee in the Oslo 2022 budget DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS,
ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 68
7724 000 – 3552 rooms (reserved for athletes and team officials). See appendix A5 for more details.




5.2.3.1.1 Description Venues are one of the most basic requirements for staging the
Olympic and Paralympic games. The Olympic host must ensure that all venues fulfil all
operational and sports-related needs. Furthermore, the IOC encourages the host to use
all venues in compliance with the best practices of health, safety and sustainability. The
Key Olympic Venues include all competition venues; the Olympic Villages; International
Broadcast Centre (IBC); Main Press Centre (MPC); Mountain Media Centre (MMC) and
other zone Media Centres where relevant; Ceremony stadium(s) and Medal Plaza(s) (where
relevant); Olympic Family Hotel(s) (OFH); accommodation villages (where relevant);
Olympic Park(s) and major common domain(s); and airports and other major points
of arrival and departure (where relevant). In addition to the Key Olympic Venues,
and where appropriate, there may be Paralympic-specific venues (competition and/or
non-competition)79. Venue costs include rent, provisionals and technical upgrades.
Although the requirements for all venues have been eased significantly under the New
Norm, technical requirements and guidelines still exist80. The overall goal is that all
venues should be planned in line with the long-term needs in the specific region. The Host
City Contract – Operational Requirements81 includes 28 requirements and suggestions
for how the host OCOG should design the Olympic venues. The key points are briefly
explained in the following.
• The host should ensure that all sports events take place in the host city of the
Olympic events. However, for reasons of legacy, sustainability and cost-efficiency,
the IOC can, according to the New Norm, allow entire sports or disciplines to be
held outside the host city, or even in another country.
• The IOC encourages the use of existing and temporary venues. Unlike under the
previous requirements, new venues should only be built if there is a sustainable
business plan for the post-Games use of the venues. Furthermore, all temporary or
79IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 39
80See IOC, Host City Contract (2015) section 3.2 compared to IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art.
39
81IOC, Host City Contract (2018a)
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relocatable venues should be planned in the most cost efficient way.
• There are no longer any minimum capacity requirements for each arena. The arena
capacities should be planned according to a local context and the goal of selling out
the stadiums. According to the New Norm, the capacity should reflect the national
interest in the host country for each sport82.
• All sports venues should follow the latest International Federation technical
requirements regarding the fields of play, warm-up space and Back-of-House facilities
for each sport. Thus, arenas which fulfil the technical requirements for World Cup
or World Championship events, will be suitable for the Olympics.
• The host should maximise the use of shared venues, between sports and between
the Olympic and Paralympic games.
• In general, the New Norm encourages the host to design all venues in the most
sustainable way possible, with regards to environmental, social and economic aspects.
5.2.3.1.2 Assumptions/our approach There are many key venues, and each has
its own detailed requirements. Naturally, evaluating the standard of all potential venues
across Norway and calculating the exact cost of the necessary upgrades would be a rather
extensive paper itself. Taking the IOC’s goal of maximising the use of existing venues, and
each venue’s technical requirements into account, we can somewhat reduce the number of
potential venues. There is a limited number of top standard sports arenas and suitable
non-competitional venues in Norway. Still, for some sports (e.g. Nordic Skiing and Alpine
Skiing) we face several alternative venues. For simplicity, we have assumed it to be equally
expensive to host a sport in any of several similar venues. For example, we assume that
the cost of organising alpine skiing is the same in Narvik as in Kvitfjell83. This implies
that our selection of venues serves as illustrative examples and that our calculated costs
are the costs of organising the games in a “generic” Norwegian winter sports venue. We
have selected the following locations for hosting the Olympic Games, based on which
venues meet the IOC’s operational requirements.
82IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018) p. 26
83Narvik has applied for the 2027 Alpine Skiing World Cup, Plener (2019), and Kvitfjell is a regular
World Cup destination, see https://www.fis-ski.com/DB/general/event-details.html?sectorcode=AL&
eventid=45145&seasoncode=2020
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Table 5.11: Suggested Cities
City Olympic Sports Paralympic Sports
Narvik Alpine Skiing Alpine Skiing, Snowboard
Oslo Nordic Skiing, Ice Hockey, Curling XC, Hockey, Curling, Biathlon
Voss Freestyle Skiing, Snowboard
Bergen84 Speed Skating, Short Track, Figure Skating
Trondheim Biathlon
Lillehammer Bobsleigh, Luge, Skeleton
We assume venues which required technical upgrades according to the Oslo 2022 analysis,
still require those same upgrades. We also assume that the (real) costs related to the
upgrades are unchanged. For example, the cost of bringing the Hunderfossen Bobsleigh
Arena up to date is still the same, only inflation adjusted.
Furthermore, we assume that the Games can rent all publicly owned venues to a price
equal to the operating costs in the period (i.e. non-profit). This includes the original
operating costs and any increase in operating costs as a consequence for technical upgrades.
The rent period is set to six months85, resulting in a rent of 50 % of the annual operating
costs for each venue. For all privately owned venues, we assume a profit margin of 10 %
on top of the operating costs.
Because our illustrative location suggestions involve six different cities, we assume that
each city would need their own “mountain media center” and “medals plaza”. These
venues are treated as generic venues. Due to fewer events in each city, the operating costs
are assumed to be somewhat lower than the mountain media center and medals plazas
suggested in the Oslo 2022 application.
Finally, we assume that the need for provisional items (TV screens, safety nets etc.) are
unchanged from the Oslo 2022 application.
5.2.3.1.3 Findings Table 5.12 displays the total venue costs. See the appendix A3
for the detailed calculations.
84Given the plans for the skating arena at Slåtthaug are set to effect, see Øystein Vik (2019).
Alternatively, these events can be relocated to other venues such as Vikingskipet, Sørmarka Arena, etc.
85Oslo 2022 assumed different rent periods for each venue, but did not specify them, with an average of
approx. 6 months, see the summary from DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia
AS (2013)
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Table 5.12: Venue costs
Competitional venues Non-Competitional venues Total
Venue rent 154 700 000 365 600 000 520 300 000
Provisional items 524 200 000 669 000 000 1 193 200 000
Technical upgrades 300 900 000 300 900 000
Total 979 800 000 1 034 600 000 2 014 400 000
Based on our assumptions, we have calculated a total venue cost of NOK 2 014 400 000.
This number seems reasonable compared to the 2026 applicants86. However, it is subject
to uncertainty.
5.2.3.1.4 Uncertainty As the IOC has moved from encouraging the construction of
new Olympic venues to maximising use of existing ones, we find it difficult to compare
our venue costs with previous Olympic Games and the Oslo 2022 application. However,
we do have the budgets from the Stockholm/Åre 2026 and Milano/Cortina 2026 Olympic
bids. These budgets include total venue costs of 172 and 276 million USD respectively.
Converted to Norwegian Kroner this is approximately 1 548 and 2 484 mNOK. Our
number, 2 125 mNOK is between the 2026 applications.
However, both the Stockholm/Åre and the Milano/Cortina applications involved building
new venues. Building a new venue is naturally far more expensive than using an existing
one, and our calculated cost is therefore somewhat surprising. For example, it is possible
that the need for provisionals is lower than we assume. Similarly, it is possible that we
have assumed unnecessarily extensive technical upgrades. Nevertheless, our calculation is
based on well-documented calculations from the Oslo 2022 application, and we are fairly
confident in most of our estimates. Thus, the sensitivity analysis is just slightly skewed
towards lower costs (table 5.13).
86International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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Table 5.13: Sensitivity analysis - Venue costs









-30 % -2 872 651 -30 % -2 618 976
-28 % -2 877 441 -28 % -2 644 905
-25 % -2 882 230 -25 % -2 670 834
-23 % -2 887 019 -23 % -2 696 763
-20 % -2 891 809 -20 % -2 722 692
-18 % -2 896 598 -18 % -2 748 621
-15 % -2 901 387 -15 % -2 774 549
-13 % -2 906 176 -13 % -2 800 478
-10 % -2 910 966 -10 % -2 826 407
-8 % -2 915 755 -8 % -2 852 336
-5 % -2 920 544 -5 % -2 878 265
-3 % -2 925 333 -3 % -2 904 194
0 % -2 930 123 0 % -2 930 123
2 % -2 934 912 2 % -2 956 052
5 % -2 939 701 5 % -2 981 980
8 % -2 944 490 8 % -3 007 909
10 % -2 949 280 10 % -3 033 838
13 % -2 954 069 13 % -3 059 767
15 % -2 958 858 15 % -3 085 696
18 % -2 963 648 18 % -3 111 625
20 % -2 968 437 20 % -3 137 554
The NPV for the project as a whole is relatively sensitive to changes in the venue costs,
especially rent and provisionals. This is because venue costs counts for a relatively large
proportion of the total cost (15 % in total). We see that if the Norwegian OCOG can bring
the venue cost close to the cost from the Stockholm/Åre 2026 application, the overall
profitability of the Olympic games in Norway would be improved by approximately 10 %
(around 25 % cost reduction in table 5.13).
5.2.3.2 Transport
5.2.3.2.1 Description A prerequisite for hosting the Olympic Games is the ability
to move the large amount of people involved to and from venues, between venues and
between the clusters. The IOC still has, although moderated by the New Norm87, a
number of quite detailed conditions regarding the transport concept88.
87IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018), page 35-36
88IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 38
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The most prominent conditions relate to the transport of accredited groups, namely
athletes and support teams, media, certain sponsor groups and some other stakeholders.
In addition, the public transport system must hold the capacity to service the many
spectators enjoying the events.
5.2.3.2.2 Assumptions/our approach Taking into consideration all details, both
those of the IOC conditions and those stemming from the inherent complexity of a
transportation problem of this scale, would make for quite an extensive paper in itself.
Naturally, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. The level of detail is also
restricted by the amount and type of information available. In any case, the uncertainty
of all the individual details would become substantial in total, undermining the value of a
detailed approach.
Our best estimate for the application of the IOC conditions in a transport concept is the
work done for the Oslo 2022 application draft89, in combination with our interpretation of
the post New Norm Host City Contract90. We found that a certain portion of the measures
taken for the Oslo application would now be redundant due to the New Norm. The
main revisions regard the Olympic Lane91, of which there is no mention in the updated
contract92, and a general loosening of the vehicle requirements, allowing for adaptations
and encouraging a more extensive use of the public transport system93.
This approach has led us to the following main guidelines:
• Accredited groups (athletes, media etc.) are to be provided transport from the most
natural entry point (Gardermoen or Flesland) to the location of their event, and
with transport the opposite way at the end of the Games.
• All volunteers require inner city transport (i.e. public transport tickets), and 10 %
of volunteers need extra buses at night94. Additionally, a portion of athletes and
media personnel are assigned a public transport ticket, roughly a one month pass
89Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013c)
90IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 38
91According to the conditions to which the Oslo application was subjected, a road or a lane was to
be dedicated exclusively to Games related transport between Olympic venues, see the summary of Oslo
Kommune Olympic Office (2013c).
92The term is used, but only on two occasions, referring to a lane at the immigration office, see IOC,
Host City Contract (2018a) pages 36 and 195.
93IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018) p. 35-36 and IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 38
94Same assumption as Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013c) page 22
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for each.
• Accredited groups (mainly athletes and media) are to be provided a number of rental
vehicles. For the sake of simplicity, we aggregate the different classes of vehicles
used in the Oslo 2022 report95 into buses and 9-seater cars. Media and national
teams are assigned a number of each, roughly matching the proportions in the Oslo
report.
• Spectators are provided a day of public transport with their ticket. This figure is
also a rough approach to the cost of increasing the overall public transport capacity.
• The principles above are also applied for the Paralympic Games, but scaled down
accordingly.
Generalising the transport problem to this extent allows us to use more reliable numbers
whilst covering all the main aspects. However, a more detailed approach might have been
better suited for utilising any potential for optimising the transport plan, such as setting a
schedule for the use of rented vehicles, maximising the use of public transport etc. Sadly,
we were unable to find detailed information about the transport plans of Milano 2026 and
Stockholm 2026, which could have enabled us to generalise to a lesser extent.
5.2.3.2.3 Findings The first step of establishing the transport cost is finding the
prices for the different means of transportation needed. This has resulted in the following
figures:
• The cost of one aeroplane ticket is based on the current price of one ticket from
Gardermoen or Flesland to Evenes at the end of next year (we assume these far-
ahead prices are less affected by the current pandemic), adjusted for inflation until
2034. This comes out at roughly NOK 1000. The cost of a train ticket is estimated
by the same principle, coming out at roughly NOK 400.
• We assume public transport tickets to have the same price in each city (this is
roughly true at least for Oslo and Bergen). The cost of one day of public transport
is estimated as the average of the daily cost of a one-month-ticket, the daily cost
of a one-week-ticket and the cost of a one-day-ticket, as we expect a mix of these
95Ibid.
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options will be used. Adjusted for inflation, this comes out at NOK 69.
• The cost of renting one 9-seater car per month (the duration of the Games), is
simply that price today adjusted for inflation, giving us about NOK 48 000. The
cost of renting a bus proved more of a challenge, as these prices are not readily
available online. We were, however, able to find the price of renting a 50-seat bus,
with a driver, from Oslo to Bergen, corresponding to almost exactly one average
working day. Adjusted for inflation, this cost is about NOK 26 000, of which we will
need 25, assuming all buses are rented for the whole duration of the Games.
Adding up the costs across all stakeholder groups and all means of transportation, our best
estimate for the total cost is NOK 221 800 000 for the Olympic Games and 49 600 000
for the Paralympic Games, as displayed in table 5.1496.
Table 5.14: Transport costs
Olympics Aeroplane Train Bus Car Public transport
Price 1 000 400 26 000 48 000 69
Required number 5 560 3 560 3 877 597 1 236 500
Cost 5 560 000 1 424 000 100 802 000 85 318 500 28 656 000
Total cost 221 800 000
Paralympics
Required number 2 114 0 881 341 256 22
Cost 2 114 000 0 22 906 000 23 546 664 1 056 000
Total cost 49 600 000
5.2.3.2.4 Uncertainty Or calculation seems reasonable, but there is of course a level
of uncertainty. On one hand, the assumption that the transport prices (tickets, rental
vehicles) follow the general inflation does not necessarily hold. The 2034 prices could prove
higher or lower than our estimate. There is also the possibility of us having underestimated
the number of vehicles required or of the mix of vehicles required being a more expensive
one.
On the other hand, and seemingly more likely, our figure is an overestimation. The New
Norm allows for a less rigid transport plan, in which vehicles can be re-allocated between
96See appendix A4 for details
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stakeholder groups, based on their specific day-to-day needs. Additionally, accredited
groups are not entitled to a vehicle if their needs can be met sufficiently by the public
transport system. These nuances are not reflected in our analysis, as they require a great
deal of information and a clear plan for the Olympic Games Programme.
In conclusion, we regard our estimate of NOK 270 million to be a reasonable, yet
conservative one. There is uncertainty in both directions, but considering the IOC revision
of their requirements, the potential for savings seems slightly greater than the potential for
additional costs. This is reflected in the interval of our sensitivity analysis which ranges
from -40% to +20%.





-40 % -2 865 621
-37 % -2 870 459
-34 % -2 875 296
-31 % -2 880 134
-28 % -2 884 972
-25 % -2 889 809
-22 % -2 894 647
-19 % -2 899 484
-16 % -2 904 322
-13 % -2 909 160
-10 % -2 913 997
-7 % -2 918 835
-4 % -2 923 673
-1 % -2 928 510
2 % -2 933 348
5 % -2 938 185
8 % -2 943 023
11 % -2 947 861
14 % -2 952 698
17 % -2 957 536
20 % -2 962 374
Because the transport costs account for only 2 % of the total cost, the NPV for the Games
as a whole is rather insensitive to changes to the transport costs.
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5.2.3.3 Medical services
5.2.3.3.1 Description Sport at the highest level pushes the athletes to their limits
and puts them at risk of injury. Winter sports are no exception. Many are even to be
considered extreme sports, such as downhill skiing, freestyle skiing, snowboarding, ski
jumping, luge and skeleton etc., where the hospitalisation of one or more athletes is
not unusual. Naturally, the host of the Olympic and Paralympic Games is required to
respond by providing medical services. The host is also required to ensure the anti-doping
regulations are met, in order to guarantee the athletes a fair contest on equal terms.
These requirements are incorporated by the IOC in the Host City Contract97. They require
the host to provide Olympic Village Polyclinics, an effective doping control programme,
and set minimum requirements for the capacity and quality of hospitals and emergency
preparedness. The impact of the New Norm is not as extensive as for other aspects of
hosting the Olympics, but there are a few implications. Most importantly, the OCOG
is allowed to let specific services or equipment be provided by local hospitals (within 15
minutes away), rather than at the Olympic Village Polyclinic98.
5.2.3.3.2 Assumptions/our approach Our best source for the specifics of the
medical services needed for the olympics and Paralympics is the Oslo 2022 application
work. However, the information available to us includes very little beside the plans for
the services and the total cost, as well as the unit costs of a few factors such as medical
doctors, nurses, administrative workers and emergency vehicles99.
For our cost estimate, we have simply used the number from the Oslo 2022 budget, and
adjusted it for inflation100. A key difference is the geographical spread of our illustrative
concept, for which we expect to need separate emergency preparedness vehicles and
Olympic Village Polyclinics in each city. Apart from this, there are the savings due to
the New Norm modifications. These are, however, a challenge to quantify, as we do not
have the insight required to judge what services and equipment required by the Oslo 2022
committee to provide in the polyclinics can now be provided by local hospitals. This
impact will be sought reflected in the sensitivity analysis.
97IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 22
98IOC, Olympic Agenda 2020 (2018) page 38
99Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013e)
100DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) page 77
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5.2.3.3.3 Findings and uncertainty Our estimate of the cost for medical and anti-
doping services is summarised in table 5.16 below101:
Table 5.16: Medical and anti-doping services
Oslo 2022 estimate 121 900 000
Additional helicopters in Narvik, Bergen, Voss and Trondheim 6 200 000
Additional ambulances 5 600 000
Administration for additional polyclinics 600 000
Total cost 134 200 000
Using the Oslo 2022 analysis as our baseline, means their evaluation of the uncertainty of
the estimate, which favoured the downside (-10/+30%)102 also applies to ours. In addition
to their considerations, we also note there is a potential for savings due to the New Norm,
leaving our span of uncertainty symmetrical at -30/+30 %.
Counting for only 1 % of the total costs, medical services is the smallest cost item in our
calculation. Additionally, all medical services costs occur during the games, leaving the
overall NPV largely insensitive to changes in medical costs.
5.2.3.4 Accommodation
5.2.3.4.1 Description The Host City Contract - Operational Requirements includes
the accommodation facilities required for both athletes/staff103 and other accredited
groups (e.g. the IOC members, media, etc.)104. The accommodation requirements for all
accredited groups, apart from the athletes and staff, describe in detail the need for rooms
in detail (both quantity and quality)105. This group requires a total of 24 000 rooms. The
OCOG is responsible for making the required number of rooms, of the required standard,
available to a fixed USD rate. This fixed rate should be set approximately one year before
the games. The OCOG is, however, not obligated to paying for the rooms. The only
financial risk the OCOG faces is the currency risk regarding the fixed rate.
The requirements for all athletes and team officials are more comprehensive. The key
101See appendix A6 for more details
102Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013e) page 78
103IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 40
104IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 1
105See IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 1 for details
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points are106:
• The host OCOG should provide one bed for each participating athlete and eligible
team official within an Olympic or Paralympic Village, which for reasons of
legacy, sustainability and cost-efficiency, can consist of one or several existing, new,
temporary or demountable residential and/or hotel facility(/-ies). The standard has
normally been such that the Olympic host constructs an Olympic Village, but under
the New Norm, this is no longer required.
• The host OCOG is responsible for accommodating all athletes and team officials in
double or single rooms.
• Athletes and team officials should stay no longer than 50 km or a one hour drive
away from their sports venue.
• The accommodation facility should be available to the athletes from four days before
the opening ceremony until three days after the closing ceremony.
5.2.3.4.2 Assumptions/Our approach In our calculation, we have distinguished
between the rooms required by all non-athlete accredited personnel (20 448) and the
accommodation needs of athletes and team officials (3 552). As the host OCOG is still
obligated to guaranteeing the availability of the rooms for other accredited groups, the the
total number (24 000) is used for checking whether or not our suggested location could
offer the required number of rooms.
We have assumed that the demand for rooms in each city is proportional to the number of
athletes whose sporting events are held there. For example, alpine skiing, held in Narvik,
accounts for 10 % of the athletes. According to our assumption, other accredited groups
require 10 % of other accredited groups’ room demand in Narvik. We assume this logic
holds for most of the rooms, but expect a fair portion is not sport-specific, and should
be allocated to the main city. Comparing our numbers with the accommodation plans
of the 2026 applicants107, we find a sports unrelated number of rooms of 6 000 to seem
reasonable.
106For all requirements, see IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 40
107International Olympic Committee (2019) page 35 and 72
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Since the Paralympics is 15 % of the size of the Olympic games108, we apply the same
logic for the Paralympic games, only scaled down by 85 %.
Although other accredited groups pay for their own rooms, we have assumed (as did Oslo
2022109) that the host OCOG charges 10 % of the room rental rate as an administration fee.
The only financial consequence is that accommodating this group will generate revenue,
see section 5.2.2.6 above.
Costs will however arise from accommodating athletes and team officials. The IOC
states that, for planning purposes, the host should plan for 4900 and 2200 athletes and
team officials for the Olympic and Paralympic games respectively110. As mentioned, the
accommodation facilities should be available from four days before the games to three
days after. For the Olympic games this would mean a total period of 23 days (4+16+3).
We assume there will be a need for inspecting every room and consequently that the rent
period is 30 days for the Olympic games. For Paralympics, we assume the rent period to
be 10 days.
Furthermore, we assume a rate of NOK 2 200 per night in 2034. This is based on a 2020
rate of 1700 (adjusted for inflation) which is in the higher end of hotel prices 111. When
taking the athletes and team officials extra requirements, such as extra cleaning service,
into account, it is reasonable to assume that the hotel room price is in fact in the higher
end.
Finally, our plan accommodates 80 % of the athletes and team officials in double rooms,
and 20 % in single rooms112.
5.2.3.4.3 Findings Using the this approach, we have calculated a total
accommodation cost of NOK 245 500 000. The administration fee for the other accredited
group is recognised as revenue. The cost for each city is shown in the table 5.17 below113.
108In 2018 the total number of Paralympic athletes was 15 % of the total number of Olympic
Athletes. This is found by adding up all athletes in the 2018 games found at https://www.olympic.org/
olympic-results
109Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013d)
110IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 40
111See for instance booking.com
112Same assumption as Oslo 2022, Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013d)




Narvik 25 344 000 6 824 400
Oslo 79 136 000 11 095 200
Voss 45 144 000
Bergen 35 640 000
Trondheim 17 424 000
Lillehammer 25 344 000
Total 228 000 000 17 500 000
5.2.3.4.4 Uncertainty As a consequence of the 2026 applicants not reporting their
total calculated accommodation cost (it is aggregated with all operating costs), we do not
have a recent basis for comparison. Oslo 2022 planned to build apartments and use them
as the Olympic village. As this model is rather different from our suggestion, a comparison
between our calculated number and the Oslo 2022 budget would be misguiding at best.
Since the IOC explicitly states the number of beds to plan for, and because the market
price for a hotel room is more or less given, we are fairly confident in our calculation. The
most uncertain factor is the rent period. The range of the sensitivity analysis is therefore
set to ±20%.
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-20 % -2 900 634
-18 % -2 903 583
-16 % -2 906 532
-14 % -2 909 481
-12 % -2 912 430
-10 % -2 915 379
-8 % -2 918 327
-6 % -2 921 276
-4 % -2 924 225
-2 % -2 927 174
0 % -2 930 123
2 % -2 933 072
4 % -2 936 020
6 % -2 938 969
8 % -2 941 918
10 % -2 944 867
12 % -2 947 816
14 % -2 950 764
16 % -2 953 713
18 % -2 956 662
20 % -2 959 611
As shown in table 5.18 above, isolated changes in the accommodation costs will have very
little impact on the overall profitability for the project. This is because accommodation
only accounts for 2 % of the total cost and occur late in the planning horizon.
5.2.3.5 Security
5.2.3.5.1 Description One of the most important responsibilities of the host, both the
OCOG and the host nation, is to guarantee the safety and security of everyone attending
the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The IOC describes the security requirements in
great detail114, and, as far as we can see, there have been no specific changes to these
subsequent to the New Norm.
5.2.3.5.2 Findings Seeing as the requirements are more or less the same today as
they were at the time of the Oslo 2022 analysis, we are comfortable reusing their number,
114IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 30
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only adjusted for inflation. We also include the non-OCOG cost of security (police and
military), as that is also a cost associated with hosting the Olympics and Paralympics115.
This leaves a cost from safety and security measures of approximately NOK 3 026 400 in
2034, as shown in table 5.19.
Table 5.19: Security
Oslo 2022 estimate 771 000 000 958 600 000
Oslo 2022 non-OCOG 1 663 000 000 2 067 800 000
Total 3 026 400 000
5.2.3.5.3 Uncertainty As the Oslo 2022 report points out, there is uncertainty in the
estimate of security personnel wages116. In addition, there is no certain way of predicting
the threat level so far in the future. On top of this, there is also the difference in Games
layout between Oslo 2022 and our concept. Spreading the events across several cities
could increase the total number of security personnel needed. On the other hand, the
same fact may also prove to decrease the need for security personnel, as the crowds of
people gathered in one place will be smaller. Summing up, there is no doubt this is an
uncertain estimate, which could equally prove to be too small as too high.
115DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 79-80 and 95-96
116Ibid. p. 79-80
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-30 % -2 384 849
-27 % -2 439 377
-24 % -2 493 904
-21 % -2 548 431
-18 % -2 602 959
-15 % -2 657 486
-12 % -2 712 013
-9 % -2 766 541
-6 % -2 821 068
-3 % -2 875 595
0 % -2 930 123
3 % -2 984 650
6 % -3 039 177
9 % -3 093 705
12 % -3 148 232
15 % -3 202 759
18 % -3 257 287
21 % -3 311 814
24 % -3 366 341
27 % -3 420 869
30 % -3 475 396
Table 5.20 shows how the project’s NPV is affected by changes in the security cost.
Because security counts for 20 % of total expenditures, changes in the security costs would
have a noticeable impact on the overall profitability of the games. However, as the largest
proportion of the security costs are related to police and military emergency services, we
believe that the OCOG has little opportunity of influencing these costs.
5.2.3.6 Technology
5.2.3.6.1 Description A successful delivery of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
requires reliable and efficient power-, telecommunication- and internet infrastructures, as
well as a sufficient utilisation and implementation of modern technology117.
The New Norm revisions have sought to ease and facilitate this for the OCOG. The
emphasis is on using existing infrastructure to as high a degree as possible, and not set the
bar any higher than what is the case for similar events such as the World Championships
117IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 36
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of the different sports. This becomes evident from the numbers we find in the Oslo 2022,
Stockholm/Åre 2026 and Milano/Cortina 2026 budgets, one of which was before the New
Norm and two after118. The latter two are quite a lot lower than the Oslo numbers, if we
adjust them all for currency and inflation to 2034 NOK, see table 5.21.
Table 5.21: Technology cost - comparison
2034 NOK
Oslo 2022 3 016 400 000
Stockholm/Åre 2026 2 751 300 000
Milano/Cortina 2026 2 474 500 000
5.2.3.6.2 Findings and uncertainty Not to over-state the effect of the New Norm
revisions, we have chosen an average of the three technology costs as our estimate. Trying
to extrapolate a new figure based on the specific needs of the 2034 Games would require a
detailed event and venue plan, detailed information about technological needs and what
is lacking, as well as a prediction of how this might change in the future, none of which is
available to us.
This approach gives us a technology cost of NOK 2 747 400 000 in 2034.
The main factors of uncertainty in this figure is its reliance upon the uncertain predictions
it is based on, as well as the remarkable rate of technological development, making it near
impossible to say what a technology concept fourteen years in the future may look like.
5.2.3.7 People management
5.2.3.7.1 Description The Winter Olympics is a large and complex event requiring
a large work-force. People Management incorporates every activity stream related to the
strategy, planning and completion of the games, covering all personnel expenses. This
includes wages and other social costs for OCOG employees; costs related to external
consultants; and all costs related to volunteers (e.g. food, beverage, uniforms, etc.), except
accommodation and transport, the first of which is irrelevant, as we assume volunteers
to be recruited locally, and the second of which is accounted for under section 5.2.3.2
Transport. The IOC provides guidelines on how the OCOG should form their people
118DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 76, International
Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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management strategy in the host city contract119.
5.2.3.7.2 Assumptions/Our approach Planning and implementing a human
resources strategy for a project of Olympic scale is far beyond our scope. Our
calculated people management costs are rather based on the budgets from Oslo 2022120,
Stockholm/Åre 2026121 and Milano Cortina 2026122. As none of these budgets present
their presumed personnel need, we have had to make some assumptions.
A large proportion of the personnel expenses from the Oslo 2022 budget is based on the
realised costs from the Lillehammer 1994 Olympics. In 2034 these numbers would be 40
years old and likely to be irrelevant due to the rapid technological changes. The work-force
required in 2034 is probably very different from the work-force size and functions required
in 1994. Furthermore, the Oslo 2022 Olympic office was heavily criticised123 for their
spending on external consultants. The 2034 OCOG should thus aim to reduce these costs
compared to Oslo 2022.
Because of the uncertainty mentioned above, we have based our calculation on the most
recent budgets. Stockholm/Åre 2026 and Milano/Cortina 2026 have people management
costs of USD 321 000 000 and USD 264 000 000 respectively. It is reasonable to assume
that the 2034 Olympics would need a similar work-force to the 2026 games. We must,
however, take the relative wage differences between the countries into account. The average
wage is higher in Norway than both 2026 applicant countries, and similar work-forces
would not be equally expensive across the three countries countries.
Furthermore, we had to take into account the real wage growth (wage growth exceeding
inflation). The Norwegian Central Bank predicted the nominal annual wage growth to
vary between 2 and 3 %124. This is close to the inflation goal of 2 % and we have therefore
assumed zero real wage growth.
Finally, to properly estimate the cash flow effects of the people management costs, we
had to acknowledge the fact that personnel expenses are among the first to occur. The
119IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 26
120DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 75
121International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37
122International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 74
123see for example NTB (2014)
124Norges Bank (2020)
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largest proportion of the costs does still occur in the years leading up to the games.
5.2.3.7.3 Findings As a consequence of the our assumptions, our estimated people
management expenses are the average of the 2026 applicants’ estimated people management
costs, adjusted to the nominal wage in NOK. These calculations are shown in table 5.22
below125.
Table 5.22: People Management
Norway 2022 Italy 2026 Sweden 2026 Norway 2034
Budget (000) NOK 3 603 000 USD 263 646 USD 321 124
2034126 (000) NOK 4 479 900 NOK 2 725 600 NOK 3 319 800
Adjusted to Norwegian wages127 NOK 3 757 600 NOK 3 841 000
Total cost (000) NOK 3 799 000
5.2.3.7.4 Uncertainty As for all our calculations, the people management expenses
are inflicted by uncertainty. The total cost is based on budgeted costs of games yet to
be held, leaving a possibility of the realised people management costs in 2026 differing
from the budgets. Adjusted to Norwegian wages, the difference between budgets from
Stockholm/Åre and Milano/Cortina is relatively small, somewhat reducing uncertainty.
We also face uncertainty as to the timing of costs. We do acknowledge the fact that
personnel expenses are the first to occur, but seeing as the relevant data is not publicly
available, we do not know when what proportion of the personnel expenses occurs. All in
all, we range our sensitivity analysis at ±30%128.
125See appendix A7 for details
126Adjusted for inflation and currency
127Wages in Sweden and Italy are 86.4% and 72.5% of Norwegian wages respectively: OECD (2020)
128Consistent with the Oslo 2022 Olympic office’s uncertainty analysis: DNV GL, Samfunns- og
Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 75
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-30 % -2 104 959
-27 % -2 187 475
-24 % -2 269 992
-21 % -2 352 508
-18 % -2 435 024
-15 % -2 517 541
-12 % -2 600 057
-9 % -2 682 573
-6 % -2 765 090
-3 % -2 847 606
0 % -2 930 123
3 % -3 012 639
6 % -3 095 155
9 % -3 177 672
12 % -3 260 188
15 % -3 342 705
18 % -3 425 221
21 % -3 507 737
24 % -3 590 254
27 % -3 672 770
30 % -3 755 287
People management counts for 26 % of the total cost and they are among the first to
occur. Naturally, as shown in table 5.23 above, changes in the people management cost
could impact the overall profitability of the project quite substantially.
5.2.3.8 Ceremonies and Culture
5.2.3.8.1 Description The winter Olympics is not only two weeks of top level sporting
competitions. The Games also include ceremonies and a cultural programme. Ceremonies
provide some of the most memorable moments of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.
They showcase the Olympic and Paralympic values, celebrate the athletes’ achievements,
contribute to the spirit of solidarity and highlight the cultural traditions of the Host City
and nation. Successful Ceremonies aim to ensure that the Olympic and Paralympic Games
are much more than just another sporting event. The cultural programme is meant to
enhance the games’ festival atmosphere and showcase the local culture. As for all other
aspects of the games, the IOC provides the host OCOG with requirements and guidelines
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on how to organise the ceremonies and cultural programme129.
The opening and closing ceremonies take place on the first and last day of the Games130.
Furthermore, the host OCOG is obligated to honour every medallist in a victory ceremony.
For the Winter Games, unlike the Summer Olympics, the New Norm has removed the
requirement of holding these victory ceremonies at a dedicated medals plaza131.
The host OCOG is free to create the cultural programme at their own will, but the
master-plan should be approved by the IOC, and must include a plan for bringing the
Olympic torch from the previous host to the Games132.
5.2.3.8.2 Assumptions/our Approach Our calculations are based the Oslo 2022
budget. Even though medals plazas are no longer a requirement set by the IOC, we have
decided to include it in our calculations, seeing as a medals plaza takes the role of a centre
for the Olympic Games in each city, thus serving as an important part of the cultural
programme. Oslo 2022 calculated the medals plaza cost (provisionals and operating cost)
to 30 mNOK (2022). We assume it will be somewhat lower as the number of events per
medals plaza will be lower.
Because we suggest another layout than the Oslo 2022 committee did, we have to scale
these costs to fit our suggested layout. Apart from this scaling, we assume that the
ceremonies and cultural costs are unchanged, except subjected to inflation.
5.2.3.8.3 Findings The cost of ceremonies and culture are displayed in table 5.24
below133. Event specific costs are the costs of the ceremonies themselves (e.g. artists and
costumes).
129IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 6 and art. 10
130Ibid. art. 6
131This is due to the Winter Games more often being spread across a wider area, see IOC, Host City
Contract (2018a) art. 39
132IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 10
133See appendix A8 for details
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Table 5.24: Ceremonies and Culture
Location Event-specific costs
Opening and Closing Ceremony Oslo 373 012 000
Medals Plaza 1 Oslo 12 433 000
Medals Plaza 2 Trondheim 12 433 000
Medals Plaza 3 Narvik 12 433 000
Medals Plaza 4 Voss 12 433 000
Medals Plaza 5 Bergen 12 433 000
Medals Plaza 6 Lillehammer 12 433 000
Cultural Programme 248 647 000
Total 2034 NOK 621 800 000
5.2.3.8.4 Uncertainty Our calculated number seems reasonable, yet uncertain.
Having based the opening and closing ceremony cost on the Oslo 2022 cost, it seems
reasonable to infer that the costs can be reduced significantly, seeing as the Oslo 2022
committee states their ceremonies and cultural programme being planned at a high level of
ambition134. Additionally, our estimation is higher than both 2026 applicants’ ceremonies
and culture budgets135. As a result, our sensitivity analysis for ceremonies and culture
examines a larger potential for savings than for greater costs.
134DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 106
135International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 37 and 74
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-40 % -2 779 535
-38 % -2 788 947
-35 % -2 798 358
-33 % -2 807 770
-30 % -2 817 182
-28 % -2 826 594
-25 % -2 836 005
-23 % -2 845 417
-20 % -2 854 829
-18 % -2 864 240
-15 % -2 873 652
-13 % -2 883 064
-10 % -2 892 476
-8 % -2 901 887
-5 % -2 911 299
-3 % -2 920 711
0 % -2 930 123
2 % -2 939 534
5 % -2 948 946
8 % -2 958 358
10 % -2 967 770
However, since the ceremonies and culture costs count for only 4 % of the total costs, and
these costs occur late in the planning horizon, the overall profitability is not very sensitive
to changes in ceremonies and culture costs.
5.2.3.9 Communication, marketing and look
5.2.3.9.1 Description The host OCOG is obligated to creating a communications
programme aiming to deliver the core messages and values of the Olympic and Paralympic
games to a global audience. Effective, clear and consistent communication throughout the
Games lifecycle generates support for the Games in the Host City and beyond. It also
mitigates risks and establishes credibility aiding the OCOG in successfully managing any
unexpected occurrences. Furthermore, the communication programme accounts for the
games look (e.g. logo and other graphical elements). The organisation and implementation
of this programme naturally generate costs.
Similarly to the people management strategy, the host OCOG are free to create their own
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communication and marketing strategy. The IOC guidelines in this regard are simply
suggestions136. The strategy must include a plan for acquiring all necessary legal rights,
such as the right to use the Olympic rings137. The IOC guidelines in this regard are simply
suggestions138.
5.2.3.9.2 Assumptions/Our Approach As for the people management costs,
communication, marketing and look costs are based on the 2026 applicants’ budgets.
There is no information available about the contents of their programmes. In terms of
content and scope, it is reasonable to assume that the communication programme will be
fairly similar in 2026 and in 2034. Furthermore, we assume that the cost difference, if any,
between the countries is negligible.
Our calculated communication, marketing and look cost is therefore the average of the
Stockholm/Åre and Milano/Cortina communication, marketing and look budgets, adjusted
for inflation and converted to NOK. We assume that the costs occur after the host of
the 2034 has been announced, and that most marketing efforts will be made in the years
closely leading up to the Games.
Table 5.26: Communcation, Marketing and Look
Stockholm/Åre 2026 Milano/Cortina 2026 Norway 2034
Communcation, Marketing and Look 536 000 000 704 000 000 620 000 000
5.2.3.9.3 Findings and uncertainty Our calculation is shown in table 5.26 above139.
Naturally, this number seems reasonable compared to the 2026 applicants. The uncertainty
of our estimation mainly relates to the estimations on which it is based, as well as its
comparability to them.
5.2.3.10 Corporate Administration and Legacy
5.2.3.10.1 Description A well organised event is crucial for the athletes’, spectators’
and other stakeholders’ experience and perception of the Games. Well organised games
136IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 9
137DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013)
138IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 9
139All numbers are nominal 2034 NOK
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require an efficient and skilled administration, as they are responsible for meeting all
requirements in the host city contract. Corporate administration and legacy costs cover
the costs related to all activities in the administration, except the cost of the personnel,
which is covered in people management.
One key change under the New Norm is the IOC’s obligation to contribute to the games.
As part of this contribution, the IOC shall make available to the OCOG the expertise
from the IOC’s and IOC Controlled Entities’ staff and advisors in the areas most relevant
for the planning, organising, financing and staging of the Games140. For the 2026 Winter
Olympics, the value of this contribution is estimated to 83 mUSD141.
5.2.3.10.2 Assumptions/Our Approach We have assumed the administration
needs to be similar to the Oslo 2022 needs. The Oslo 2022 budget is based on the
realised costs of the Lillehammer 1994 which, as mentioned, might be outdated and
imprecise. The Oslo 2022 Olympic office did, however, significantly adjust the numbers
for a more modern Olympic administration. We assume that the cost difference between
2022 and 2034 are more or less negligible, and apply the inflation adjusted number as our
estimate.
Similarly, we have adjusted the value of the IOC contribution for inflation, assuming that
the real value of the contribution will remain unchanged.
Finally, we have assumed that the administration costs follow the same distribution as
the people management costs. In doing so, we acknowledge that administrative costs are
among the first to occur.
5.2.3.10.3 Findings As a consequence of the our assumptions, we have calculated
the following corporate administration and legacy costs (table 5.27).
Table 5.27: Corporate Administration and Legacy
Oslo 2022 NOK 1 114 000 000
Gross 2034 NOK 1 385 100 000
IOC Contribution 2034 NOK 858 000 000
Net 2034 527 100 000
140IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) §12.b
141Ibid.
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5.2.3.10.4 Uncertainty As our input is based on 30-year-old costs, there are naturally
uncertainty regarding the input of our calculation. Furthermore, there is uncertainty
regarding the timing of the IOC contribution. Even though we are fairly certain about
the value, we have no information about when the host OCOG will receive the IOC
contribution. This will naturally have a cash flow effect and thus influence the NPV.
For this reason, we have selected a sensitivity interval of ±20%, examining a possible
estimation error in both directions142.





-20 % -2 853 797
-18 % -2 861 429
-16 % -2 869 062
-14 % -2 876 694
-12 % -2 884 327
-10 % -2 891 960
-8 % -2 899 592
-6 % -2 907 225
-4 % -2 914 857
-2 % -2 922 490
0 % -2 930 123
2 % -2 937 755
4 % -2 945 388
6 % -2 953 020
8 % -2 960 653
10 % -2 968 286
12 % -2 975 918
14 % -2 983 551
16 % -2 991 184
18 % -2 998 816
20 % -3 006 449
Since the corporate administration and legacy cost is 4 % of the total cost, the overall
profitability is not very sensitive to it changing. Administrative costs are among the first
to occur, somewhat increasing the sensitivity.
142Consistent with the Oslo 2022 committeeDNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF
Advansia AS (2013) p. 81
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5.2.3.11 Other expenses
5.2.3.11.1 Description We have defined other expenses as "other expenses" and all
"Non-OCOG Operating" costs from the Oslo 2022 budget, serving as a proxy for the costs
we have not identified elsewhere143.
"Other expenses" in the Oslo 2022 budget include ticket costs, technical services, acquiring
the rights of the Olympic rings, IOC royalties from revenue, environmental costs, loss on
sponsor services and compensation of fees related to visas. We have assumed all these
costs are still relevant, except for the following:
• Ticket costs, which are mainly generated by the production and printing of every
ticket. In 2034 we assume that all tickets are distributed digitally.
• IOC Royalties, which is not relevant under the New Norm. The IOC does not
receive royalties from ticket sales, official merchandise and domestic sponsors144.
NON-OCOG operating costs are all costs arising from the Olympics, which are not
assigned to the OCOG, for example costs related to environmental projects and planning
costs for the use of public services as a consequence of the Games.
5.2.3.11.2 Findings and uncertainty Adjusted for inflation, we have the calculated
the following other expenses (table 5.29).
Table 5.29: Other costs
OCOG-related
Oslo 2022 Other costs 745 000 000
Adjustment for digital tickets - 44 900 000
Adjustment for IOC royalties - 167 900 000
Not OCOG related
Environmental costs 183 000 000
Public planning costs 141 000 000
Total 856 200 000
As a result of the lack of available data, these costs are highly uncertain. However,
counting for only 6 % of the total costs, they make a fairly small item, leaving a small
143DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 82-83 and 95-97
144IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) p. 21
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impact on the overall profitability.
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6 Expanded net present value
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of a project analysis is to compute a decision basis for the relevant decision
makers145. So far, we have evaluated the consequences of winter Olympics 2034 based
solely on the cash flow. We have seen that the project cash flow is not profitable in itself.
Our analysis so far has resulted in a static net present value, under the assumption
the project is owned passively over its duration. As mentioned under section 4.4, this
assumption is a simplification. In the real world, the project owner will often have
the opportunity to behave actively, exploiting opportunities arising during the project’s
lifetime. This flexibility is what we have described as real options. Valuating real options
for the Olympic project is beyond our scope, but we will undertake a discussion of what
potential options might exist and how they might influence the decision of whether or not
hosting the 2034 Winter Olympics is worthwhile.
In addition, our static net present value only accounts for the direct costs and benefits
of the project. In the eyes of this project’s owner, the country of Norway, the indirect,
external effects are just as, if not more important. Ignoring these, we run the risk of
ignoring factors which could have an impact, but are not part of the project’s cash flow.
The proper identification and valuation of such effects is also beyond our scope, but we
will take this opportunity to comment some potential external effects and discuss their
possible influence on the decision.
The discussion under this section will aim to give some indication as to what the expanded
net present value of the Olympic project might amount to under our examples of potential
real options and external effects. In other words, it aims to illuminate the question of
whether Norwegian Authorities should support the Games with NOK -2 930 123 000 in
exchange for the net value of potential real options and external effects.
145Bøhren and Gjærum (2009)
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6.2 Flexibility and real options
After the host city contract is signed, the applicant OCOG is responsible for organising and
staging the Games at the time agreed upon146. The IOC requires a third-party guarantee
that the Games will be held. This guarantee is normally given by the host country,
but could also be given by a financial institution. Any options related to suspending or
cancelling the Games altogether are therefore none-existent; once the host city contract is
signed, the Games shall be held according to the specified terms.
There could, however, exist several real options for following up with further investments.
According to the operational requirements, the host OCOG should adapt all venues to
fit the current and future needs, but could improve the venues at the IOC’s approval147,
implying that if the current or future needs change between the bid period and the Games,
the host OCOG has the opportunity to adapt the venues to the updated needs. For
example, say the host OCOG plans on hosting the sliding events (bobsleigh, luge and
skeleton) in a venue with a capacity of 6 000 people. In the years leading up to the
Games, the national interest in bobsleigh increases significantly, leading the host OCOG
to believe they could sell 15 000 tickets to the sliding events. As long as the IOC approves
an upgrade of the arena, the host OCOG is free to implement it. Selling 15 000 tickets will
naturally be more profitable than selling 6 000 tickets, making such upgrades opportunities
for increasing the project’s value, and should thus be considered a real option. For such
an option to have relevant influence on the decision of going for the project, an indication
of its probability of occurring would of course need to be evident at the time of making
the decision.
Similar examples could be made for all sports and venues. Because the host city contract
regulates how the Games should be held, the room for other options, such as options
to abandon or suspend the project, are however small. In any case, the presence of one
or more real options would have the effect of increasing the expanded net present value
relative to the static one.
This is not an exhaustive discussion of all real options involved in the project. It is merely
intended to illustrate the need to include the value of flexibility in the basis for deciding
146IOC, Host City Contract (2018b) part I.
147IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 39
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whether or not to host the 2034 Winter Olympics.
6.3 External effects
6.3.1 In general
One of the key arguments justifying expensive Olympic Games has traditionally been
that the Games have a large economic impact and leaves a positive footprint for the host
region. Some estimates from the Vancouver 2010 Olympics claimed that the benefits
would increase GDP by more than $ 10 billion, and that the Games would generate more
than 240 000 new jobs148.
We do not have the ambition of undertaking a full scale cost/benefit analysis, but we will
discuss some important external effects and highlight the importance of including such
factors in a decision of whether or not to host the Winter Olympics.
6.3.2 Tourism
The Winter Olympics represent a large opportunity to showcase Norway as a tourist
destination. Increased tourism was seen as the most important Olympic effect on Norwegian
businesses149 by the Oslo 2022 Olympic office. This is also the ambition of Idrettens
Olympiade, who seek to activate a potential for winter tourism to complement the summer
counterpart150. It does not seem unlikely that the Olympics will increase activity in
businesses such as restaurants, hotels and tourist attractions151. The Oslo 2022 Olympic
Office found an increase in foreign hotel nights in Lillehammer after the 1994 Games152.
As one of the largest and most prestigious sporting events, The winter Olympics is often
seen as a catalytic force driving tourism in the host country. Milan/Cortina 2026 states
in their Olympic bid that "games would boost tourism and stimulate the rural mountain
economy"153. Similarly, the Vancouver 2010 OCOG said an increase of 2.7 million tourists
over a 7-year period around the games was achievable154.
148InterVISTAS Consulting Inc (2002)
149DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 128
150Idrettens Olympiade, presentasjon (2020)
151DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 128
152Ibid.
153International Olympic Committee (2019) p. 55
154InterVISTAS Consulting Inc (2002)
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Increased tourism is, however, not documented for any Winter Olympics after 1994 (or
any other mega-event). Fourie and Santana-Gallego (2011) studied mega-events’ impact
on tourism in the host country and its neighbour countries. Out of all their observations,
a statistically significant positive impact was only found in the event year. For the
years following the Games, a weak negative correlation was found. Owen (2005) strongly
suggests that the Olympics had a significant crowding out effect on the rest of the tourism
industry, leaving no net impact on total tourism in the Olympic host country. These
findings suggest that the tourism effects often used to justify seemingly unprofitable mega
events might be overestimated or assigned an over-ambitious probability.
Norwegian tourism is facing a rapid growth, and NHO predicts that tourism in Norway
will increase by almost 20 % in the next 10 years155. It is likely that organisations such
as Visit Norway or Fjord Norge will use the Olympics to launch a campaign intended to
increase tourism. If such a campaign succeeds, there is a potential for realising an increase
in tourism similar to the observation after the Lillehammer 1994 Olympics.
The Oslo 2022 Olympic office calculated a real economic impact of 1.7 billion NOK156. If
this calculation is correct, increased tourism would greatly increase the expanded NPV of
the 2034 Olympics.
6.3.3 Environment
The IOC emphasises the importance of green Olympics and requires all Olympic activities
to be held in accordance with sustainability best practices157. Nevertheless, hosting
emission free games, also taking biodiversity into account, and at the same time fulfilling
all IOC’s operational requirements, seems an immense challenge.
As we have mentioned, there are needs for technical upgrades in some of the venues in
order to meet the technical requirements. For example, we suggest building a new field of
play and a new lift for the snowboard and freestyle events. Even though the construction
of these upgrades will have to be done with a minimum of environmental impact, some
impact must be expected.
155NHO Reiseliv (2020)
156?
157See for instance IOC, Host City Contract (2018a) art. 39
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Furthermore, we suggest an extensive transportation plan involving cars, planes and buses.
Even though the host could use the most sustainable transportation fleet available, it
is unlikely, with the current technology, to transport hundreds of thousands of people
without emitting climate gases.
These are two examples of how the winter Olympics can have a negative environmental
impact. Naturally, the monetary value of these external effects is difficult to measure and
they are naturally uncertain due to the progress of sustainable technology. Whether or
not this cost should be assigned to the 2034 Olympics depends of the alternatives at hand,
or in other words whether the Olympics has a larger impact than “business as usual”,
considering a great portion of these effects are global. Nevertheless, the winter Olympics’
environmental impact should be considered upon deciding whether or not to apply for the
winter Olympics 2034.
6.3.4 Security
A crucial responsibility for the Olympic host is to guarantee the safety for everyone
who attend the Olympics. Naturally, this involves emergency services (medical, police,
military). This responsibility involves both negative and positive external effects.
The Olympics (and other mega-events) draw massive international media attention which
makes the Games a potential target of terrorism. This could create a sense of uncertainty
and concern in the population. The Oslo 2022 Olympic Office found that this was the case
for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics158. It is important to bear in mind that the external part
of this effect is that which is not already accounted for through an increased preparedness.
To handle this terror threat, the host country must increase their security and prepare the
emergency services for critical events. The winter Olympics could thus serve as training
ground for the emergency services, providing valuable knowledge and experience.
Similarly to the environmental effects, the monetary value of the external security effects
arising from the Olympics is difficult to measure. Still, they should be considered.
158Oslo Kommune Olympic Office (2013f) p. 67
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6.3.5 Oslo 2022
As part of the quality control of the Oslo 2022 application for a state guarantee, DNV GL,
Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) conducted an analysis of
the economic impact from the Oslo 2022 Olympics. A large proportion of the economic
impact is related to investments in venues, villages and infrastructure (e.g. increased
capacity on the Oslo metro). Because we suggest maximising the re-use of existing
venues, villages and infrastructure, the economic impact related to these investments is
not relevant.
The DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) findings,
without economic effects from investments in venues, villages and infrastructure are
displayed in table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Oslo 2022 external effects - updated
Monetary value
Police 660 000 000
Volunteers 180 000 000
Domestic sponsorship -490 000 000
Tourism 1 780 000 000
Net monetary economic impact 2 130 000 000
Non-monetary valued
Perceived happiness + + + +
Security and preparedness ±
Environmental impact - -
Option value of other interests +
• Police: the value of investments in police vehicles and equipment which has a value
in post-Games use.
• Volunteers: the monetary value of the volunteers’ utility of working at the Olympic
and Paralympic Games. It is valuated to the cost of food, clothes and other services
provided to the volunteers159
• Domestic sponsorship: the negative value of domestic sponsor funds being
allocated away from other events, to the Olympics.
159DNV GL, Samfunns- og Næringslivsforskning AS, ÅF Advansia AS (2013) p. 37
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• Tourism: the value of increased tourism in Norway before, during and after the
games.
This is not an exhaustive list of external effects. They serve as examples of how a mega-
event, such as the winter Olympics influences other stakeholders and the society as a
whole. Estimating the monetary value of all external effects is outside our scope, but they
should certainly be included in the basis for the decision of whether to host the Olympics.
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7 Conclusion
The aim of this study has been assessing the profitability of launching a project, hosting
the 2034 Winter Olympics in Norway, focusing mainly on the direct cash flow effects. The
resulting static net present value represents the basis for what indirect implications of the
project, the value of flexibility and external effects, are required for making the project a
sound one to undertake.
Our analysis shows the project has a static net present value of NOK -2 930 123 000, over
the sixteen years until it ends. This means, over the same period, Norway, as the project
owner, is inflicted a negative effect on its cash flow. It is important to keep in mind this
result relies heavily upon uncertain estimates and assumptions. Where several alternative
and equally reasonable assumptions have been available to us, we have generally chosen
the more conservative one. Nevertheless, our result comes out negative by such a large
margin that we regard the likelihood of finding a positive one based on more accurate
information to be small.
Certain measures could, however, aid in improving the project value. As our findings
rely on the processes and strategies chosen by the organisers of the Games concepts we
have used as our sources, optimising and improving on these can potentially help decrease
certain costs. Perhaps most importantly, we have found the effects of the New Norm to
have had a noticeable impact on several cost items compared to what was the case for
Oslo 2022. With access to better and more detailed information, the full cost savings
potential of the New Norm revisions could be more readily available to the decision maker.
However, the decision of launching a national project such as this would not depend on
the static net present value alone. Whenever a discussion of hosting the Olympics comes
up, the main focus in on its indirect and future impacts on the economy. Our study
touches on this subject with a brief discussion of the potential effects imposed on the
expanded net present value by real options and external effects.
Before any confident decision can be made, we would suggest a further study into the real
options and external effects of the project. Based on our own findings, the present value
of these impacts, as well as the effects of any cost saving measures, would need to exceed
NOK 2 930 123 000.
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Table A1.4: Audience - Paralympics
Sport % Of tickets sold % of paralympic tickets Estimated tickets sold
Alpine skiing 6.84% 11.63% 39600
Biathlon 15.38% 26.18% 89000
Sliding 7.18%
XC 23.93% 40.72% 138500
Nordic combined 7.18%
Ski jumping 10.94%
Curling 2.77% 4.71% 16000
Figure skating 1.85%
Freestyle skiing/SB 8.20% 6.98% 23700





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Adjusting for inflation and growht:
A = r · (1 + I + g)t (A2.1)
r = input revenue in NOK
I = Inflation goal
g = excess growth
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Venue rent and provisional = venue rent + provisionals (A3.1)
Venue rent = Rent + Change in operating costs (A3.2)
Venue infrastructure = Technical upgrades (A3.3)
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Table A4.1: Transport demand - Olympics
Route Sport Athletes and support Media Staff Spectators
Departure Destination Volunteers Security Health/medic
Oslo Lillehammer Sliding 640 580
Oslo Bergen Skating
Oslo Narvik Alpine skiing 640 900
Oslo Trondheim Biathlon 440 800
Bergen Voss Freestyle, SB 1 140 750
Inner city
Oslo Nordic, curling, hockey 2 160 2 700 610 591 600
Lillehammer Sliding 640 580 170 84 000
Voss Freestyle, SB 1 140 750 80 96 000
Bergen Skating 900 1 300 330 138 600
Narvik Alpine skiing 640 900 210 80 000
Trondheim Biathlon 440 800 150 180 000
Table A4.2: Transport plan - Olympics
Route Aeroplane Train Bus Public transport Car
Departure Destination
Oslo Lillehammer - 1 280 - - -
Oslo Bergen - - - - -
Oslo Narvik 3 080 - - - -
Oslo Trondheim 2 480 - - - -
Bergen Voss - 2 280 - - -
Inner city
Oslo - - 1 475 616 510 219
Lillehammer - - 341 90 270 62
Voss - - 473 105 530 106
Bergen - - 695 149 930 94
Narvik - - 482 87 910 67
Trondheim - - 411 186 350 49
Total 5 560 3 560 3 877 1 236 500 597
Cost 5 560 000 1 424 000 100 802 000 85 318 500 28 656 000
Table A4.3: Transport demand - Paralympics
Departure Destination Sport Athletes andsupport Media Volunteers Spectators
Oslo Narvik Alpine, SB 517 540
Inner city
Oslo XC, biathlon, curling,ice hockey 804 960 798 276700
Narvik Alpine, SB 517 540 458 63300
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Table A4.4: Transport plan - Paralympics
Route Aeroplane Train Bus Public transport Car
Oslo Narvik 2 114
Oslo 558 277 498 14
Narvik 323 63 758 8
Demand 2 114 - 881 341 256 22
Cost 2 114 000 - 22 906 000 23 546 664 1 056 000
Table A4.5: Transport prices
Aeroplane Train Bus Public transport Car
Unit Ticket Ticket One bus for8 hours Ticket
One 9 seater
for 1 month
Average cost per unit 1 000 400 26 000 69 48 000
Calculations:
Sets:
C1 = set of cities
C2 = set of departure cities
C3 = set of destination cities
G = set of stakeholder groups




Dgde = amount of people from stakeholder group g departing from city d,
having city e as their destination
Tvde = 1 if vehicle v is used for transport between city d and city e, 0 otherwise
Igc = amount of people from stakeholder group g
requiring inner city transport in city c
Pv = price per unit of vehicle v
Mgv = proportion of stakeholder group g allocated vehicle type v
(25% of athletes/support, 87% of media personnel
and 10 % of volunteers require buses;
75% of athletes/support and 13% of media personnel require cars;
everyone gets public transport, athletes and media get 5 each (one month))












PvNv(2DgdeTvde + IgcMgv) (A4.2)
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Table A5.1: Accommodation demand - Olympics
Sport Athletes/support Media Volunteers Region
Alpine skiing 640 900 210 Narvik
Icehockey 1000 1400 275 Oslo
Freestyle/Snowboard 1140 750 80 Voss
Figure skating 300 450 76 Bergen
Short track speed skating 240 450 76 Bergen
Speed skating 360 400 180 Bergen
Curling 220 400 115 Oslo
Nordic 940 900 220 Oslo
Biathlon 440 800 148 Trondheim
Bob/Luge/Skeleton 640 580 170 Lillehammer
Table A5.2: Accommodation plan - Olympics









Narvik 1 900 0 0 2 0 0
Oslo 12 600 17 000 17 340 0 0 0
Voss 3 500 900 918 0 750 0
Bergen 2 700 6 000 6 120 0 0 0
Trondheim 1 300 1 400 1 428 0 0 0
Lillehammer 1 900 2 600 2 652 0 0 0
Table A5.3: Accommodation demand - PL
Sport Location Athletes/support Media
Alpine skiing Narvik 440 460
Icehockey Oslo 264 270
Snowboard Narvik 77 80
Curling Oslo 110 120
Nordic Oslo 330 340
Biathlon Oslo 100 230
Table A5.4: Accommodation plan - Paralympics





Narvik 1100 1500 1530 0
Oslo 1700 17000 17340 0
90 A5 Accommodation
Table A5.5: Accommodation cost - Olympics
Cost Rooms OCOGmust pay for Hotel rooms
Narvik 384 25 344 000
Oslo 1296 79 136 000
Voss 684 45 144 000
Bergen 540 35 640 000
Trondheim 264 17 424 000
Lillehammer 384 25 344 000
Table A5.6: Accommodation cost - Paralympics
Cost Hotel rooms
Narvik 6 824 400
Oslo 10 612 800
Total 17 437 200









Hotel room 1 700 2 200 30 days 10 days
Calculations:
Sets and parameters:
C = Set of host cities
G = Set of games
dc = Accommodation demand in city C
ac = Athletes who compete in city C
yc = Binary (1 if city c is the main city, 0 otherwise)
rc = Rooms OCOG must pay for in city c
Tg = rent period for games g
P = price per room/day
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Calculating accommadation demand:




+ 6000 · yc, 8c 2 C (A5.1)











rc · P · tg (A5.3)
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Table A6.1: Medical services - input for adjustments
Personell Yearly(Oslo 2022 estimate) Hours per year Hours per shift
Medical doctors 1 500 000 1 700 8
Nurses/optitians
/administrative positions 1 000 000 1 700 8
Medical vehicles Per shift Per day Operative days
Helicopter 50 000 25
Ambulance 15 000 45 000 25
Calculations:
Sets and parameters:
MV = Set of medical vehicles
NC = Set of host cities that was not part of the Oslo 2022 concept
P = Set of medical personnel
cmv = Daily operating cost of medical vehicle mv
dnc = Operating days for medical services in new city nc
wp = Hourly cost of personnel P
sp = Lenght of shifts for personell P
qp = Required number of presonell P
Extra medical vehicles in four additional cities:





cmv · dnc (A6.1)
Extra personnel in four additional cities.





qp · wp · sp · dnc (A6.2)
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Table A7.1: People management - Adjustment
Wages Norway Sweden Italy
Budget (2034 NOK) 4 479 900 000 2 725 600 000 3 319 800 000
Average annual wages 54 027 46 695 39 189
Index 1 0.864 0.725
Adjusted to Norwegian wages 3 841 100 000 3 757 600 000
Calculations:
Sets and parameters:
c = Set of examined countries
wc = average annual wages in country C
bc = People management budget of applicant country C
Adjusting to Norwegian wages:
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A8 Ceremonies and culture
Event/Venue Location Cost
Opening and Closing Ceremonies Oslo 373 000 000
Medal plaza 1 Oslo 12 400 000
Medal plaza 2 Trondheim 12 400 000
Medal plaza 3 Narvik 12 400 000
Medal plaza 4 Voss 12 400 000
Medal plaza 5 Bergen 12 400 000
Medal plaza 6 Lillehammer 12 400 000
Cultural programme 248 700 000
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Table A9.1: Timeline of revenue and expenditures
Revenue 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036
IOC Contribution 50 % 50 %
TOP Programme 2 % 2 % 5 % 13 % 13 % 15 % 50 %
Domestic sponsorship 2 % 2 % 5 % 13 % 13 % 15 % 50 %
Ticket sales 60 % 40 %
Licensing and merchandising 5 % 15 % 80 %
Other revenue 5 % 25 % 60 % 10 %
Expenditure
Venue infrastructure 25 % 50 % 25 %
Venue rent and provisionals 40 % 60 %
Transport 100 %
Accommadation 100 %
Medical services 100 %
Security 100 %
Technology 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 %
People management 1 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 5 % 5 % 5 % 12 % 13 % 15 % 50 % 3 % 2 %
Ceremonies and culture 1 % 1 % 1 % 2 % 25 % 70 %
Communication, marketing and look 3 % 5 % 10 % 20 % 40 % 20 % 2 %
Corporate admin. and legacy 1 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 5 % 5 % 5 % 12 % 13 % 15 % 50 % 3 % 2 %
Other expenses 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 10 %
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